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The Supreme Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle
Richard Moberly*

Abstract
In five cases issued during the last five years, the Supreme Court interpreted
statutory anti-retaliation provisions broadly to protect employees who report
illegal employer conduct. These decisions conflict with the typical understanding
of this Court as pro-employer and judicially conservative. In a sixth retaliation
decision during this time, however, the Court interpreted constitutional antiretaliation protection narrowly, which fits with the Court’s pro-employer image
but diverges from the anti-retaliation stance it appeared to take in the other five
retaliation cases. This Article explains these seemingly anomalous results by
examining the last fifty years of the Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. In
doing so, a persistent theme emerges: the “Anti-Retaliation Principle,” which the
Court uses to advance the notion that protecting employees from retaliation will
enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws. The Court has used the AntiRetaliation Principle for a half-century to strengthen statutory protection from
employer retaliation. However, the Court also has demonstrated consistently that
it considers the Principle to be primarily a statutory, rather than a constitutional,
norm. The Anti-Retaliation Principle explains the recent cases and provides a
reasoned and consistent standard against which they can be evaluated.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle provides important
lessons for courts as they confront the need to prevent employers from retaliating
against employees who report illegalities.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; J.D., magna cum laude,
1998, Harvard Law School. I appreciate the helpful comments from Steve Willborn and the
participants at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools who attended a presentation of this
paper. Susan Schneider provided excellent research assistance. A McCollum Research Grant
provided support for the research and writing of this Article.
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Introduction
In each of five recent cases involving statutory retaliation claims by
employees, the Supreme Court upheld the employee’s claim and
expanded protection from employer retaliation.1 A sixth employment
retaliation case in 2006 involved a First Amendment claim with a
dramatically different result. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the Court found in
favor of the employer and severely restricted constitutional antiretaliation protection.3
Together these cases present a confusing and seemingly contradictory
view of the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Court’s
holdings in the five statutory cases could indicate that the Court favors
employees in retaliation cases—a conclusion that would strike many
commentators as odd given the Court’s decidedly mixed record of
protecting employee rights in the past decade.4 On the other hand, the
1 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 852-53
(2009) (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442,
128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 128
S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 56-57 (2006) (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3 See id. at 426 (finding that the First Amendment did not protect government employees who
speak about matters of public concern if the employee speech was part of the employee’s job
duties).
4 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and
Employment Cases, 13 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 288-89 (2009) (noting that the Roberts Court has
issued several decisions that undercut an employee’s ability to bring employment claims in federal
court); Scott Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 983 (2007) (“In employment discrimination, it is as if there are two Supreme
Courts issuing conflicting rulings.”); Anita Silvers, et al., Disability and Employment Discrimination at
the Rehnquist Court, 75 MISS. L.J. 945, 946 (2006) (noting “[the] Court's general pattern of favoring
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Court’s Garcetti opinion significantly narrowed government employees’
protection when they blow the whistle on employer misconduct,5 perhaps
indicating a deeper resistance to retaliation protection. Moreover, as
explained in more detail below, taken together the Court opinions appear
untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy, which has created
difficulty for commentators trying to explain the Court’s twists and turns.6
This Article attempts to bring consistency and cohesion to this morass
by placing these recent retaliation cases in the context of a half-century of
Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence. This process illuminates the
Court’s underlying rationale in retaliation cases generally, which I label
the “Anti-Retaliation Principle.” The Anti-Retaliation Principle differs
from other justifications for retaliation protection because it focuses on the
notion that protecting employees from retaliation will enhance the
enforcement of the nation’s laws.7 Moreover, it both explains the recent
Supreme Court cases and provides a reasoned and consistent standard
against which they can be evaluated. Importantly, the Court’s use of the
Principle also offers guidance for the way courts ought to approach the
issue of employer retaliation in the future.
Part I of the Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court historically
has approached retaliation cases differently than typical employment
matters. In employment cases, the Court often balances the employer’s

plaintiffs in race and sex... discrimination cases, while being decidedly pro-defendant in ...
disability-related claims”); Jonathan R. Harkavy, Supreme Court of the United States: Employment Law
Commentary: 2007 Term, at 2 (noting that although employees “won” more cases than they lost in
2007, there was no “discernable shift in the Court’s orientation as an employer-friendly forum”)
(manuscript on file with author); Marcia Coyle, Term’s Five Key Bias Decisions Were Mixed, NAT’L L.J.
(July 6, 2009), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431973694&
Terms_five_key_bias_decisions_were_mixed_&slreturn=1 (quoting Professor Paul Secunda’s
statement that “[t]his Court tilts substantially towards pro-employer interests”). As Professor Scott
Moss has noted, even though the Court has issued some rulings protecting employees in
discrimination cases, the Court’s “anti-litigation” policies “significantly harm” the Court’s
commitment to fighting discrimination. See Moss, supra, at 986; see also Harkavy, supra, at 37 (“[T}he
unspoken, yet unmistakably apparent, agenda of the new majority is enhancement of employer
prerogatives, recently focusing on protection of the at-will doctrine.”).
5 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426.
6 See discussion infra Part II.C.
7 Commentators have provided numerous other rationales for anti-retaliation protection. See,
e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405, 1434-35 (1967) (arguing that courts should adopt a
tort of “abusive discharge” based on a fairness principle that employees are economically
dependent on employers); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 21-22 (2005) (asserting
that retaliation protection is another form of statutory prohibition on discrimination); Richard R.
Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 245-46 (2009) (arguing that retaliation protection
should be provided to “citizen employees” who act in the public interest); Stewart J. Schwab,
Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (asserting that
“the search for third-party effects is the driving force behind” the tort of wrongful discharge);
Robert G. Vaughn, How Differing Perceptions of Whistleblower Protection Influence the Character of Legal
Standards, at 1 available at www.corrupcion.unam.mx/documentos/ponencias/C_Vaughn.pdf
(describing four separate justifications for protecting whistleblowers).
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interests against the employee’s interests.8 In retaliation cases, however,
the Supreme Court uses the Anti-Retaliation Principle to also consider
society’s interest in effective enforcement of the laws—an interest the
Court believes can be advanced through strong anti-retaliation protection
for employees.9 For the past fifty years, the Court has applied this
Principle consistently in statutory retaliation cases, but taken a slightly
more cautious approach in First Amendment cases.
Prior to this Article, the Supreme Court’s extensive case law regarding
retaliation has never been examined through the organizing lens of the
Anti-Retaliation Principle. Rather, commentators often examine these
cases in isolation, through principles developed for the specific statute or
constitutional provision under which the retaliation claim arose. For
example, commentators examine retaliation cases as involving discrete
subject matters such as discrimination,10 the First Amendment,11 or
preemption.12 This first part of the Article steps back from the “trees” of
individual substantive issues and explains the “forest” of retaliation cases.
Part II examines how the Court relied upon the Anti-Retaliation
Principle, both explicitly and implicitly, in the six recent retaliation cases.
Ultimately, the Principle explains the Court’s current retaliation
jurisprudence and provides a principled way to evaluate the Court’s
decisions: do these decisions advance the Court’s own Anti-Retaliation
See, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (noting
that a “main principle” in the Court’s public employment cases is that “although government
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights
must be balanced against the realities of the employment context”); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 793-808 (1998) (balancing various employer and employee interests in creating
vicarious liability rule for supervisors under Title VII but also providing for employer affirmative
defense); UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 206-208 (1991) (narrowly interpreting Title VII’s
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense based on balancing employee’s rights against
employer’s business needs and rejecting test that also considered interests of a pregnant woman’s
unborn child); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting the “delicate
balance between employee and employer rights struck by Title VII”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (discussing Title VII’s “balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987) (“In the case of searches conducted
by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of
privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the
workplace.”); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945) (approving an
administrative board’s balance “between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to
employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain
discipline in their establishments”). Cf. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability against any undue hardship to
the employer).
9 See discussion infra Part I.
10 See, e.g., Brake, supra note 7, at 21-22 (examining retaliation as a part of discrimination law).
11 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 COLO. L. REV.
1101, 1102-07 (2008) (examining First Amendment protection for federal employees).
12 See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the
Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S. D. L. REV. 63, 89-98
(1989) (examining Supreme Court’s analysis of federal preemption of state wrongful discharge
claims under the Labor Management Relations Act).
8
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Principle by enhancing the enforcement of law? As this Part explains, in
the recent statutory cases the Court furthered the Anti-Retaliation
Principle by privileging the Principle over other norms that may have
seemed sacrosanct to this Court. By contrast, although the lone
constitutional case explicitly references the Anti-Retaliation Principle, the
rule adopted by the Court in Garcetti likely will undermine society’s
interest in law enforcement.
Identifying and explaining the Court’s reliance on the Anti-Retaliation
Principle has significant ramifications for the future of retaliation law,
which I discuss in Part III. First, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for
the 2010-11 Term in two cases that will test the boundaries of the AntiRetaliation Principle. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp.,13
the Court will examine whether the Fair Labor Standards Act’s antiretaliation provision protects employees who file oral as well as written
complaints.14 Furthermore, Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP15
presents the issue whether Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits
an employer from retaliating against a third-party who is associated with
an employee who engaged in protected conduct.16 The Court could use
the Anti-Retaliation Principle to broaden anti-retaliation protections under
these statutes, despite arguments that the statutory language at issue in
each case seemingly excludes the employees’ claims.17
Second, respecting the Court’s view of the Anti-Retaliation Principle
should cause lower courts to evaluate retaliation cases through this same
lens. This perspective might impact a number of retaliation issues
currently percolating. For example, courts have been struggling with the
level of causation required by various retaliation statutes,18 and the AntiRetaliation Principle can help provide some guidance on this complicated
issue.19 Further, a focus on law enforcement would help courts interpret
when a whistleblowing employee has a “reasonable belief” that an
employer has violated the law, an issue that lower courts often have used
to undermine statutory protection from retaliation.20

130 S. Ct. 1890, No. 09-834 (March 22, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp., No. 09834, 2010 WL 146471 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2010).
15 130 S. Ct. 3542, No. 09-291 (June 29, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
16 See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291, 2009 WL
2876195 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2009).
17 See discussion infra Part III.A.
18 See discussion infra Part III.B.
19 A recent non-retaliation Supreme Court case, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct.
2343 (2009), which dealt with the appropriate level of causation under the discrimination provision
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, will enhance this struggle. See id. at 2350.
20 See discussion infra Part III.B.
13
14
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I. The Past: The Supreme Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle
During the last fifty years of its retaliation jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has recognized that employees must be protected from retaliation in
order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and criminal laws. This
“Anti-Retaliation Principle” allows the Court to examine anti-retaliation
protection as a law enforcement tool that benefits society, rather than
simply as extra protection for employees provided at a cost to employers.
The Court makes three assumptions throughout its opinions to support
the Principle: (1) employees are in the best position to know about illegal
conduct by their employer or other employees; (2) employees will report
this information if the law protects them from employer retaliation; and
(3) employee reports about misconduct will improve law enforcement.
Significantly, the Court has applied the Principle in statutory cases
differently than in First Amendment retaliation cases. In statutory cases,
the Court broadly interpreted explicit anti-retaliation provisions and
implied anti-retaliation protections even when no specific provision
existed. The Court’s First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence, however,
provides an outer limit of the Principle. Although the Court recognized
the Anti-Retaliation Principle’s importance in these cases, the Court also
suggested that statutes, rather than the Constitution, might be the better
source for anti-retaliation protection.

A.

Statutory Protection

Professor Clyde Summers once noted that labor law’s purpose always
has been to address the imbalance in bargaining power between
employees and employers.21 From this perspective, statutory and judicial
employment protections exist to protect employees’ “primarily noneconomic interests in fairness, personal dignity, privacy, and physical
integrity.”22 These legal protections must be balanced against the
employer’s countervailing interest in the flexibility and efficiency
provided by the at-will employment rule.23 In non-retaliation labor and
employment cases, the Supreme Court has recognized this balancing of
legal protection for employees against the economic burden that
protection places on employers.24 Particularly in recent years, however,
21 Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7,
7 (1988).
22 Id. at 15.
23 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951-69 (1984)
(describing the efficiency of the at-will employment rule); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability against
any undue hardship to the employer).
24 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting the “delicate
balance between employee and employer rights struck by Title VII”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (discussing Title VII’s “balance between employee rights and employer
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that balance seems to be weighted towards employer interests in many
non-retaliation decisions.25
By contrast, the Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation Principle in
statutory retaliation cases typically has led to enhanced employee
protection compared to other types of employment law cases. In these
retaliation cases, the Court often utilized the Anti-Retaliation Principle’s
“law enforcement” perspective to weigh a third interest: the interest of
society in having the law enforced. As described below, the Court placed
great weight on this societal interest because, in the Court’s formulation,
protecting employees from retaliation increases employees’ willingness to
provide information about illegal activity, which in turn advances societal
law enforcement goals.
Several cases that demonstrate the Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation
Principle involved statutes without explicit legislative history about the
purpose of anti-retaliation legislation. This legislative silence often
required the Supreme Court to explicate this purpose by utilizing the
Anti-Retaliation Principle to justify a broad reading of a statutory antiretaliation provision.26 For example, in the Court’s first modern case
involving a statutory anti-retaliation provision, Mitchell v. Robert De Mario
Jewelry, Inc.,27 the Court examined Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards
prerogatives” by eliminating “certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise
preserving employer’s freedom of choice); see also note 8, supra, (citing cases involving this
balancing).
25 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2351-52 (2009) (requiring high
burden of proof for plaintiffs regarding causation in ADEA cases); Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___,
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009) (limiting ability of employer to consider impact of potential disparate
impact claim when engaging in affirmative action); Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553
U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156-57 (2008) (restricting application of constitutional Equal Protection
Clause to public employees); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638-43 (2007)
(limiting statute of limitations for discrimination cases).
26 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the rare exception, and even that legislative
history is sparse. Congress included an anti-retaliation provision in the NLRA, one of the first
employment statutes it enacted, to protect employees who “file charge or given testimony” related
to a violation of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4); see also STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND
PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 93 (2001) (“Among the oldest statutes that protect employees
(and supervisors) who engage in protected conduct, which under some circumstances can be
classified as whistleblowing, is the National Labor Relations Act.”) (citation omitted). Congress
adopted this language from an earlier executive order issued under a predecessor statute explicitly
so that employees would feel free to file charges when an employer violated the NLRA’s
substantive provisions. See Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Law by Boz-A Theory of Meyers Industries,
Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Bird Engineering, 71 IOWA L. REV. 155, 171 (1985); NAT’L LAB. REL.
BOARD, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, VOL. I, Debate on S. 1958
in Senate, at 2401 (comments of Sen. Wagner) (noting that without an anti-retaliation provision
“even though there might be flagrant violations of the provisions of this measure, an employee
would not be free to file charges”).
27 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Twenty-three years before Mitchell, the Supreme Court upheld a
provision of the NLRA that prevents another form of retaliation. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court found constitutional Section 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158,
which prohibits employers from engaging in “unfair labor practices,” such as interfering with
employees who exercise their NLRA rights and discriminating against employees to discourage
union membership. See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 33-34.
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Act (FLSA).28 This provision explicitly gave federal courts jurisdiction to
enjoin violations of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision, but the case
presented the question of whether the provision also permitted courts to
order that an employer pay damages to employees who were retaliated
against in violation of the Act.29 Although the FLSA seemed to limit
courts’ powers to only injunctive relief,30 the Supreme Court held that the
judiciary’s implicit, equitable powers in injunction cases included the
power “to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes,”
including awarding back pay damages.31 The Court based its holding
explicitly on the Anti-Retaliation Principle:
[C]ongress chose to rely on information and complaints
received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed
to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus
only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials with
their grievances. This end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3) against
discharges and other discriminatory practices was designed
to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear of
economic retaliation might often operate to induce
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard
conditions. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in
§ 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by the Secretary
pursuant to § 17, Congress sought to foster a climate in which
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would be
enhanced.
In this context, the significance of reimbursement of lost
wages becomes apparent. To an employee considering an
attempt to secure his just wage deserts under the Act, the
value of such an effort may pale when set against the
prospect of discharge and the total loss of wages for the
indeterminate period necessary to seek and obtain
reinstatement. Resort to statutory remedies might thus often
take on the character of a calculated risk, with restitution of
partial deficiencies in wages due for past work perhaps
obtainable only at the cost of irremediable entire loss of pay
for an unpredictable period. Faced with such alternatives,
29 U.S.C. § 217.
See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 289.
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 217 (giving district courts jurisdiction “for cause shown, to restrain violations
of [the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision]. Provided, That no court shall have jurisdiction, in any
action brought by the Secretary of Labor to restrain such violations, to order the payment to
employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages in such action”).
31 Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
28
29
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employees understandably might decide that matters had
best be left as they are. We cannot read the Act as presenting
those it sought to protect with what is little more than a
Hobson's choice. 32
Thus, in Mitchell, the Court broadly interpreted a statutory anti-retaliation
provision because it recognized that employees needed strong remedies in
order to encourage them to come forward with information about
violations of the law. Moreover, the Court asserted that Congress
specifically intended for employee information to play a role in the
statute’s enforcement scheme.
After Mitchell, the Court consistently wove language supporting the
Anti-Retaliation Principle into its interpretations of statutory antiretaliation protections. In NLRB v. Scrivener,33 the first Supreme Court case
to use the term “retaliatory discharge,”34 the Court found that the
National Labor Relations Act protected employees who gave sworn
statements to a National Labor Relations Board field examiner, even
though the part of the Act’s anti-retaliation provision at issue seemed to
limit its protections to employees who file formal charges or testify at a
formal hearing.35 Limiting the statute’s protections to a narrow reading of
the provision’s text, according to the Court, would undermine the
Congressional purpose of the Act to encourage “all persons with
information about [unfair labor] practices to be completely free from
coercion against reporting them to the Board.”36 Employees need
“complete freedom” to report in order “to prevent the Board’s channels of
information from being dried up by employer intimidation of prospective
complainants and witnesses.”37 Yet again, the Court acknowledged the
important role of employee information in enforcing the law.
Scrivener began a series of cases in which the Court found that express
anti-retaliation statutory provisions should be interpreted broadly in
order to support the Anti-Retaliation Principle.38 For example, in Brock v.
Roadway Express, Inc.,39 the Court recognized the importance of employee
reports to detect illegal safety violations in the transportation industry40
Id. at 292-93 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
405 U.S. 117 (1972).
34 See Humprhies v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 408 (2007) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in
part) (citing NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972)).
35 See Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 125. The Court interpreted Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which
provides that an employer may not “discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
36 See id. at 121.
37 See id. at 122 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir.
1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 See id.
39 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
40 See id. at 258.
32
33
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and upheld a statutory scheme that permitted an administrative agency to
temporarily reinstate a fired whistleblower because “the eventual
recovery of backpay may not alone provide sufficient protection to
encourage reports of safety violations.”41 Mirroring the “Hobson’s choice”
language from Mitchell,42 the Brock Court accepted Congress’ rationale for
the whistleblower protections:
Section 405 was enacted in 1983 to encourage employee
reporting of noncompliance with safety regulations
governing commercial motor vehicles. Congress recognized
that employees in the transportation industry are often best able to
detect safety violations and yet, because they may be
threatened with discharge for cooperating with enforcement
agencies, they need express protection against retaliation for
reporting these violations.
…
Congress also recognized that the employee's protection
against having to choose between operating an unsafe
vehicle and losing his job would lack practical effectiveness
if the employee could not be reinstated pending complete
review. The longer a discharged employee remains
unemployed, the more devastating are the consequences to
his personal financial condition and prospects for
reemployment. Ensuring the eventual recovery of backpay
may not alone provide sufficient protection to encourage
reports of safety violations. Accordingly, § 405 incorporates
additional protections, authorizing temporary reinstatement
based on a preliminary finding of reasonable cause to
believe that the employee has suffered a retaliatory
discharge.43
Similarly, the Court paid particularly close attention to the role Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision plays in enforcing that law and advancing
the Act’s goals, even though Title VII’s legislative history contains little
insight into the purposes of its anti-retaliation provision. The primary
purpose of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, according to the Court in
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,44, is to help enforce the law by “[m]aintaining
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”45 In Robinson, the
Court examined whether Title VII protected former employees from
Id. at 258-59.
See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 293.
43 Brock, 481 U.S. at 258-59 (emphasis added).
44 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
45 Id. at 346.
41
42
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retaliation.46 The Court admitted that, “at first blush” Title VII’s plain
statutory language excluded former employees from protection because it
applies only to “employees,” which “would seem to refer to those having
an existing employment relationship with the employer in question.”47
Yet, after scrutinizing the term in other parts of Title VII, the Court
determined that its meaning was “ambiguous.”48 To resolve this
ambiguity, the Court relied on the Anti-Retaliation Principle, holding that
former employees should be protected from retaliation because the Court
did not want to undermine the effectiveness of the statute by “allowing
the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination
from complaining to the EEOC.”49
The Court also applied the Anti-Retaliation Principle by permitting a
statutory retaliation claim to proceed even though the statute at issue did
not contain any anti-retaliation language. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc.,50 the Court held that a statutory anti-discrimination provision, 42
U.S.C. § 1982, contained an implied cause of action for retaliation.51 Section
1982 provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same
right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.”52 Despite the clear absence
of any explicit protection from retaliation in the statutory language, the
Sullivan Court upheld a retaliation claim by a white landowner who was
retaliated against for leasing a house to a black man.53 The Court
concluded that if an individual could be “punished for trying to vindicate
the rights of minorities protected by § 1982,” then “[s]uch a sanction
would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on
property.”54 In other words, enforcing § 1982 meant providing additional
protection from retaliation, even if the statute itself did not contain any
explicit anti-retaliation protection.
The outcomes of retaliation cases also demonstrate the Court’s
recognition of the Anti-Retaliation Principle’s importance as much as the
opinions’ language, particularly in statutory cases. For example, during
the last fifty years, the Court interpreted statutes to enable a broad range
of individuals to bring retaliation claims, including third parties who

See id.
Id. at 341.
48 Id. at 343-44 (“Once it is established that the term ‘employees’ includes former employees in
some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous and each section
must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further meaning that would
resolve the issue in dispute.”).
49 Id. at 346.
50 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
51 See id. at 237.
52 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
53 See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237.
54 Id.
46
47
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report statutory violations,55 former employees,56 at-will employees,57
elected union officials against their union,58 and illegal aliens.59 Moreover,
the Court indicated that these statutes provide a wide range of remedies60
to victims of a wide range of retaliatory actions by employers.61
Significantly, the Court also recognized the importance of state retaliation
remedies by not permitting federal statutory schemes with weak
retaliation remedies to impliedly preempt potentially stronger state tort
claims based on an employer’s retaliation.62
A few counterexamples exist in which the Court did not recognize the
Anti-Retaliation Principle and its primary goal of protecting society’s
interest in law enforcement. Instead, the Court utilized its typical
“employment law” focus and concentrated only on balancing the interests
of employers and employees. Clark County School District v. Breeden63
presents an example of this type of case. In Breeden, the plaintiff alleged
that she had been retaliated against for complaining about alleged sexual
harassment and for filing a lawsuit based on the complaint.64 In the case’s
primary holding, the Supreme Court found in favor of the employer
Id. (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (interpreting Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision).
57 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), which
prevents “intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings,” includes
protection for at-will employees).
58 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern’l v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (interpreting LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412).
59 See Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984) (holding that reporting undocumented
aliens employees to law enforcement authorities was an unfair labor practice under the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3), when done in retaliation for participating in union
activities).
60 See Brock, 481 U.S. at 258-59 (approving an administrative agency’s power to order
temporary reinstatement as a remedy for retaliation); Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 296 (finding that FLSA
gave courts power to award back-pay damages in addition to ordering injunctive relief). But see
Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 902-03 (restricting the backpay and reinstatement remedies for illegal aliens).
61 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. at 2412-15 (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision applies outside of the workplace and prohibits any employer action that
“could well dissuade a reasonable employees from protected conduct”); Haddle, 525 U.S. at 125
(preventing companies from firing at-will worker in retaliation for testifying in federal trial); Bill
Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) (permitting courts to enjoin an
employer from filing a “baseless” lawsuit to retaliate against an employee in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act).
62 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (holding that the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., does not preempt state public policy tort and whistleblower
claims); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (holding that Section 210(a) of the
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a) does not preempt employee’s intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412-13 (1988)
(holding that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, does not
preempt employee’s tort remedy for wrongful discharge). But see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (holding that Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. § 1140, expressly preempted employees state common law claim of
wrongful discharge).
63 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
64 See id. at 269-70.
55
56
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because it found that the plaintiff did not engage in protected activity.65
According to the Court, no reasonable person could have believed that the
alleged sexual harassment about which the plaintiff complained could
have violated Title VII because it was a single instance of behavior that
could not violate the law.66 After Breeden, courts consistently adopted a
standard that an employee must have a “reasonable belief” in the illegality
of an employer’s action in order to be protected from retaliation.67
As applied by the Court in Breeden, this standard may not fully
advance the goals of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. Indeed, the Breeden
Court never mentioned the importance of retaliation protection for
enforcing Title VII. Instead, the Court cited almost exclusively to its sexual
harassment jurisprudence to demonstrate that the activity about which the
plaintiff complained could not be considered sexual harassment because it
was a single incident that was not “extreme” enough to be considered
“extremely serious”.68 This sexual harassment jurisprudence requires
“severe or pervasive” employer action that alters the terms and conditions
of employment,69 a standard derived from the Court’s previous balancing
of employer and employee interests.70 Unlike the other retaliation cases
mentioned above, the Court in Breeden never discussed whether its
holding would promote better compliance with the law.71
See id. at 270-72.
See id. at 271. The Court also found that the plaintiff could not prove causation—that any
protected activity caused an adverse employment action. See id. at 272-73. In doing so, the Court
relied exclusively on various factual showing regarding the timing of the alleged protected activity
and the adverse action. See id. The Court did not discuss, or even mention, the appropriate legal
standard for causation in a retaliation case, nor did the Court attempt to explain any policy
rationale for the decision.
67 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the Objectively
Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities under Title VII’s Anti-retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007) (stating that all United States Circuit Courts adopted the objectively
reasonable standard after Breeden) (citing cases). Courts also use the reasonable belief standards for
other statutes, such as Title IX and Title VI, that do not specify the standard to be utilized. See
Brake, supra note 7, at 83 (citing cases).
68 See id. at 270-71 (citing to Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998),
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), and Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986)).
69 See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
70 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793-808 (balancing various employer and employee interests in
creating vicarious liability rule for supervisors under Title VII but also providing for employer
affirmative defense); Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-82 (asserting the reasons why permitting same-sex
sexual harassment claims would not turn Title VII into a “general civility code” and stating that
“[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive”);
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (noting that the Court’s sexual harassment standard “takes a middle path”).
71 The case likely does not represent a serious deviation from the Anti-Retaliation Principle.
One group of commentators states that Breeden “may simply be a case of unsympathetic plaintiffs
making ‘bad law,’” rather than a “signal of the Supreme Court’s hostility to retaliation cases in
general.” See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 160 (3rd ed. 2005).
65
66
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To be fair, though, the “reasonable belief” standard adopted by the
Court seems more generous to employees than requiring the employee to
report an actual illegality, another viable option at the time because the
statute’s language supports providing protection only if an employee
opposes employment practices that are “made . . . unlawful” by Title VII.72
In other words, the Court could have justified a standard requiring the
reporting employee to prove actual employer illegality instead of only a
reasonable belief that conduct was illegal.73 Moreover, several “employeefriendly” retaliation statutes explicitly adopt the “reasonable belief”
standard articulated in Breeden and many would consider that to be a
sensible requirement for protection from retaliation, assuming it is applied
appropriately.74 In Breeden, however, the Court adopted this standard
without examining its effect on the goal of anti-retaliation protection: to
increase compliance with the law. Moreover, the application of the
standard in Breeden may have encouraged subsequent courts to
inappropriately scrutinize an employee’s whistleblowing complaint by
placing itself in the position of the employee and assuming too much legal
knowledge.75 In Part III, infra, this Article addresses how the AntiRetaliation Principle could better inform the application of Breeden’s
reasonable person standard.
The Court also has read other anti-retaliation statutory provisions
more narrowly than the Anti-Retaliation Principle might have required. In
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson,76 for
example, the Court held that the statute of limitations for the retaliation
provision of the False Claims Act (FCA)77 should be based upon the most
closely analogous state limitations period rather than the likely longer sixyear statute of limitations that applies to the other provisions of the Act.78
The Court recognized that the limitations provision was “ambiguous,” but
ignored the Anti-Retaliation Principle.79 Instead, the Court based its
holding on the application of several different principles of statutory
construction rather than a consideration of whether various statutes of
limitations would encourage or discourage employees to report illegal

72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See also Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1133 (“[T]he statutory language
indicates that the activity the employee opposes must violate Title VII.”).
73 See EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975); Rosenthal, supra
note 67, at 1140-41 (“[T]he Court’s language [in Breeden] suggested that perhaps it would require an
actual violation, as the statute’s language requires.”)
74 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1); Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act 2008, 15 U.S.C. § 2087(a)(1); see also discussion infra Part III.B.
75 See discussion infra Part III.B (providing examples of lower courts inappropriately applying
Breeden’s reasonable belief standard).
76 545 U.S. 409 (2005).
77 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
78 See Graham Cty., 545 U.S. at 422.
79 See id. at 415-17.
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conduct.80 As the dissent in that case noted, the Court’s holding would
likely undermine the Anti-Retaliation Principle by leaving some
whistleblowers at the mercy of state statute of limitations that likely are
shorter than the FCA’s six year limitations period.81 Privileging the AntiRetaliation Principle over other canons of statutory construction, as the
Court did in the five recent statutory retaliation cases,82 would have likely
led to stronger retaliation protection—the outcome advocated by the
dissent.83
More recently, the Court undermined qui tam whistleblower rights
under the False Claims Act by finding that whistleblowers could not rely
on disclosures made in state and local administrative reports.84 Although
this case did not address the FCA’s retaliation provision, it likely will
reduce the number of whistleblowers potentially protected from
retaliation simply because it narrows the scope of an employee’s
“protected activity” that triggers anti-retaliation protection.85 That said,
the Court’s opinion focused more on the balancing necessary in a qui tam
case rather than on the balancing retaliation cases require.86 Moreover,
even in this case, to some extent the Court actually reinforced the core law
enforcement tenet of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. The Court defended
its holding by noting that it would not give state and local governments a
way to immunize themselves from a qui tam lawsuit, thereby increasing
illegal fraud.87 If state and local governments disclosed fraud in an
administrative report, then the United States and the “most deserving”
whistleblowers could still bring a qui tam action to ensure the law is
enforced.88
See id. at 418-19.
See id. at 427-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 See discussion infra Part II.C.
83 See Graham Cty., 545 U.S. at 427-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court also narrowly read the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to exclude a whistleblower’s retaliation claim; however, the
Court never examined or mentioned the Anti-Retaliation Principle. See Saudia Arabia v. Nelson,
507 U.S. 349, 362-63 (1993). Instead of focusing on whistleblower issues, the Court’s analysis
focused on whether the alleged retaliatory action was “commercial” or conducted pursuant to the
police power of a foreign sovereign nation. See id. at 360-63.
84 See Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, ___
U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2010).
85 See, e.g., McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp.2d 672, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding that
plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by filing a qui tam action because his complaint was
based on publicly-available information, and therefore was not “in furtherance” of an FCA case, as
required by the FCA’s retaliation provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)).
86 The Court described the goal of the qui tam provision as “[s]eeking the golden mean between
adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and
discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of
their own.” Graham County, 130 S. Ct. at 1406 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal R.
Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
87 See id. at 1410-11.
88 Id. at 1410. The Court called identified whistleblowers who were the original source of the
information about fraud as the “most deserving” whistleblowers who would not be hurt by the
rule. See id.
80
81
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Taken together, these few “limiting” cases may nibble around the
edges of the Anti-Retaliation Principle. However, they do not undermine
the Principle’s power when explaining the balance of Supreme Court
retaliation jurisprudence and its broad recognition of the importance of
anti-retaliation protection. During the last fifty years, the Court’s
retaliation jurisprudence involving statutory cases sends a clear message:
employees comprise an important part of enforcing statutory laws and the
Court will provide employees broad protection from retaliation in order
to enhance enforcement of those laws.

B.

First Amendment Protection

The Court’s First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence provides a
slightly more nuanced application of the Anti-Retaliation Principle.
Although the Anti-Retaliation Principle informs the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding First Amendment protections for government employees who
disclose illegal conduct, it does not drive the decisions in the same way as
with statutory claims.
Beginning with Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist.
205,89 the Court has held that the First Amendment can prohibit the
government from retaliating against employees who speak out as citizens
regarding matters of public concern.90 As recently put by the Court, “[s]o
long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public
concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary
for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”91 This “public
concern” test provides potentially broader protection than the AntiRetaliation Principle’s “law enforcement” focus because protected
employee speech may involve a matter of public concern but not any
violation of the law.92 As a result, the Court’s incorporation of the
Principle in its First Amendment case law requires a more nuanced
examination of the cases.
First, in accordance with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, the Court
repeatedly has emphasized that the First Amendment must protect
government employees because these employees often have knowledge
the public would want to know about government operations. For
example, in the seminal Pickering case, the Court prohibited the discharge
of a teacher for speaking about school funding.93 The Court protected the
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See id. at 568.
91 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983)).
92 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (noting that the First Amendment protected a teacher who
spoke about school budget issues because the topic was a matter of public concern).
93 See id. (“[A] teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not
furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”).
89
90
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teacher from retaliation, in part, because “[t]eachers are, as a class, the
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should
be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely
on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”94 Similarly, in
Waters v. Churchill,95 the Court recognized that government employees
“are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which
they work.”96 The Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation Principle in First
Amendment cases recognizes employees’ special knowledge and protects
them from retaliation in order to encourage making this information
public.
Second, the Court’s First Amendment test considers not just the
balance between the employee’s and employer’s rights, but also asserts
that courts must balance society’s right to information as well. For
example, in Pickering, the Court upheld a First Amendment retaliation
claim in order to protect the “public interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”97 Later cases noted
the Court’s concern for retaliation protection in this area because the fear
of discharge could “chill” employee participation in public affairs, which
would damage larger societal interests.98 As put most explicitly by the
Court in San Diego v. Roe,99
[u]nderlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that
public employees are often the members of the community
who are likely to have informed opinions as to the
operations of their public employers, operations which are
of substantial concern to the public. Were they not able to
94 Id. at 572; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (noting that “many other categories of public
employees” in addition to teachers also will have “informed and definite” opinions about issues
related to their job).
95 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
96 See id. at 674; see also San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that public
employees have “informed opinions on important public issues”).
97 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
98 See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (noting that an
independent contractor relationship with the government “provides a valuable financial benefit,
the threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill speech on matters of public
concern by those who, because of their dealings with the government, “are often in the best
position to know what ails the agencies for which they work’” (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 674, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1887, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45
(1983) (“In all of these cases, the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes
and actions sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. The
issue was whether government employees could be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of discharge
from joining political parties and other associations that certain public officials might find
‘subversive.’”); cf. Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern’l v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (noting the
“chilling effect” of speech retaliation, which the “free speech” provision of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act aimed to prevent).
99 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curium) (citation omitted).
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speak on these matters, the community would be deprived
of informed opinions on important public issues. The
interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving
informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to
disseminate it.100
The “public concern” doctrinal requirement acknowledges that more is at
stake than simply the employer-employee relationship. The government is
an employer, but it cannot restrict speech in which society might be
interested. Consistent with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, this
constitutional test differs from the Court’s typical focus in non-retaliation
employment cases by considering society’s interest in protecting
employees with important information.
Third, the Court has recognized that much of this First Amendmentprotected speech will necessarily relate to employee reports regarding
violations of the law.101 In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District,102 an employee informed her principal that the school district’s
policies were discriminatory, which the Court later recognized as
“clear[ly]” involving a matter of public concern.103 The Court provided
even more insight in Connick v. Myers,104 a case in which the Court found
that an employee’s behavior was, for the most part, not protected because
the employee was not speaking about a matter of public concern.105 The
Court contrasted the non-protected speech in Connick with examples of
speech that would be protected, such as “bring[ing] to light actual or
potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust” on the part of other
government employees.106 Thus, although the “public concern” test is not
solely about law enforcement, the Court certainly has supported the AntiRetaliation Principle by providing First Amendment protection to
government employees who bring illegalities to light.107
Id. at 82.
By protecting speech related to a “public concern,” the Court certainly has a purpose
broader than solely enhancing law enforcement—the Court encourages debate related to a widerange of topics. However, as described in the following text, protected topics of “public concern”
often relate to employee reports of illegal conduct.
102 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
103 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (citing to Givhan and stating that “[a]lthough the subject-matter
of Mrs. Givhan’s statements were not the issue before the Court, it is clear that her statements
concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of
public concern”); see id. at 148 n.8 (noting that the Givhan plaintiff’s protest regarding racial
discrimination was “a matter inherently of public concern”).
104 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
105 See id. at 147-49.
106 Id. at 148.
107 This conclusion must be tempered somewhat by the Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006), in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect an employee
who reported misconduct if that report was made as part of the employee’s job duties. See id. at 421
(“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
100
101
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In constitutional cases in particular, the Principle does not mean that
employees always win. In several constitutional cases after Pickering, the
Court determined that the First Amendment did not protect the employee
who brought a claim. None of these cases, however, involved an
employee who claimed protection because the employee identified
violations of the law. Instead, losing employees claimed protection based
on speech unrelated to illegal conduct, including complaints about a
school dress code,108 criticisms of an agency,109 threats to patient care,110
and personnel matters.111 Indeed, before Garcetti, whether the Court
granted First Amendment protection to employee speech is precisely
correlated with whether the speech related to reports of illegality. An
employee reported a violation of law in each of the only two cases since
Pickering in which the Court upheld a First Amendment claim. In Givhan,
the employee made an internal report about potential violations of
discrimination laws.112 In Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr,113 the Court
extended First Amendment protection to an independent contractor (as
opposed to an employee) who made critical statements about a county
government, including an accusation that the county had violated the
law.114
As with statutory violations, some Supreme Court First Amendment
decisions actually seem to undermine retaliation protection. For example,
the Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle115
provides employers an affirmative defense in First Amendment retaliation
cases if the employer can demonstrate that it would have made the same
employment decision even in the absence of the employee’s protected
conduct116—a defense that Congress subsequently adopted in several

not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). I discuss this case and explain this
discrepancy in more detail infra Parts II.B. & II.C.
108 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
109 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 369 (1983).
110 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1994). In Waters, the parties disputed the
precise speech involved, but the Court found that, even if the employee’s version was true, she
conducted the speech in a disruptive manner, making it unprotected. See id. at 680-81.
111 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983). One part of Connick presents a close
question regarding whether the Court upheld retaliation against an employee reporting illegality.
In Connick, the Court found that one question on a questionnaire an employee distributed to fellow
employees did involve a matter of public concern: whether employees ever felt pressure to work
on political campaigns on behalf of candidates supported by the government employer. See id. at
149. The Court found that this question involved “coercion of belief in violation of fundamental
constitutional rights.” Id. The Court held, however, that the Pickering balancing of interests did not
support permitting a constitutional retaliation claim because the questionnaire disrupted the office
and involved a matter of public concern “in only a most limited sense.” See id. at 151-54.
112 See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413.
113 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
114 See id. at 671.
115 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
116 See id. at 287.
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whistleblower statutes117 and that courts often incorporate when
construing other anti-retaliation protections.118 Although this decision
provides less protection to employees, it does not necessarily do so at the
expense of the Principle. In fact, the Court implicitly considered the
Principle when it reached this result, finding that the “constitutional
principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated” when employers are still able
to make an employment decision based upon an employee’s nonprotected conduct.119 According to the Court, for all of the good that
government employees can do when they bring misconduct to public
light, they should not be able to put themselves in a “better position” as a
result of their disclosure than they would have been had they remained
quiet.120 Consistent with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, government
employees who engage in constitutionally protected speech will be
protected in the first instance. Mt. Healthy affirms that Principle, even if it
makes clear that protected speech will not inoculate an employee from
disciplinary action based on other conduct.121
Yet, despite incorporating and identifying aspects of the AntiRetaliation Principle in its constitutional retaliation cases, the Court has
indicated at least one substantive limit even when employees report
potential violations of the law. Statutes, not the Constitution, should drive
the Principle. In Bush v. Lucas,122 the Court prohibited a federal employee
from bringing a First Amendment retaliation case for damages against a
retaliatory supervisor.123 In that case, the Court recognized the AntiRetaliation Principle, but thought that existing statutory protections under
the Civil Service Reform Act sufficiently protected the Principle: “In the
past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level
government employees are a valuable source of information, and that
supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates'
117 See, e.g., Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 U.S.C.
§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (adopting procedures of
49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). However, in these statutes Congress required employers to prove this
affirmative defense by “clear and convincing” evidence. See id.
118 See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY
DISCHARGE 234-35 & 235 n.42 (2d ed. 2004) (citing cases).
119 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286.
120 See id. at 285.
121 Of course, fact-finders may have an extremely difficult time applying these standard in
reality, as it requires a relatively difficult inquiry into employer motives. The point here is that the
Court upheld the core tenet of the Principle even as it was finding against a whistleblowing
employee in this particular case.
122 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
123 See id. at 385-90. Although the employee in Bush did not report a violation of the law, the
Court’s holding was broad enough to prohibit constitutional damages even to federal employees
who reported illegalities. See id. at 369-72 (noting that the employee alleged retaliation based on the
employee’s criticism of a government agency and assuming that the government supervisor had
violated the employee’s First Amendment rights by demoting him because of this protected
speech).
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freedom of expression.”124 Given the presence of the Civil Service Reform
Act protections, the Court determined that it should not second-guess
Congress’ conclusion regarding the extent to which the Principle should
be protected.125
Thus, for the most part, prior to 2006 the Court’s First Amendment
retaliation cases recognized and advanced the Anti-Retaliation Principle.
Because society has an important interest in learning about the valuable
information known by government employees, the Constitution protects
government employees who reported violations of the law. However, the
Court did impose a limitation on the Principle based on the Court’s
understanding that statutes, not the Constitution, should drive antiretaliation protection if statutes addressed the issue.

II. The Present: Six Retaliation Cases in Five Years
The Supreme Court’s six recent retaliation cases build upon this
extensive jurisprudence and reflect the Court’s historical recognition of
the Anti-Retaliation Principle. Five decisions related to the extent to which
various federal statutes prohibited retaliation in employment, including
three that involved implied protection from retaliation in three different
statutes without an express anti-retaliation provision.126 The other two,
one in 2006127 and one most recently in 2009,128 analyzed the express antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129 As
explained below, the Court provided broad retaliation protection in all
five statutory cases, often with explicit reference to the Principle, despite
traditional statutory interpretation and policy rationales that might argue
for more narrow holdings. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,130 the lone constitutional
case among the six recent decisions, the Court explicitly recognized the
Principle, but also continued its more limited view of retaliation
protections in constitutional cases based on the Court’s preference for
statutory coverage.131
The first two sub-parts that follow briefly describe these six recent
cases and summarize the Court’s decisions. The third sub-part analyzes
the cases in light of the Court’s historic use of the Anti-Retaliation
Principle.
Id. at 389.
See id.
126 See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008); Gomez-Perez
v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1935 (2008); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167, 171 (2005)
127 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
128 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
129 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
130 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
131 See discussion infra Part II.B & II.C.
124
125
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A.

Statutory Protection

Statutory anti-retaliation protection can be either express or implied.
Express provisions provide the most common form of protection: over
thirty-five federal statutes contain an explicit provision protecting
employees from retaliation for undertaking various protected activities.132
These statutes often detail the type of employees and employers covered
by the provision, the type of activity in which employees must engage to
be protected, and the type of remedy available to employees.133 More
rarely, a court will find that a statute that does not provide explicit
protection still contains anti-retaliation protections implicitly.134 Because
of a general judicial reluctance to imply statutory remedies, the Court only
upheld one implied retaliation claim prior to 2005—Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc.,135 discussed above136—and that case did not involve an
employee.137 Beginning in 2005, however, the Court upheld implied
retaliation claims by employees in three separate cases involving three
separate statutes.
1.

Implied Retaliation Protection

The first of these three cases, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,138
involved the claim by a high school teacher and basketball coach that the
Birmingham Board of Education retaliated against him because he
complained about sex discrimination in his school’s athletic program.139
The plaintiff asserted his claim of retaliation under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,140 which generally prohibits
discrimination “on the basis of sex” in federally funded education
programs.141

132
133

See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 319-20 (listing statutes).
See Richard E. Moberly, Contract Protection for Whistleblowers, 79 COLO. L. REV. 975, 981-83

(2008).

See KOHN, supra note 26, at 87-88.
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
136 See discussion supra Part I.A.
137 Recall that in Sullivan, the Court held that a white property owner stated a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 when he alleged that a home owner’s association retaliated against him for leasing his
house to a black man. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237.
138 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
139 See id. at 171. The plaintiff had complained that the girls’ basketball team received unequal
funding and had unequal access to athletic equipment and facilities. See id. After his complaints,
the plaintiff received negative evaluations and the school removed him as the girls’ basketball
coach, both of which the plaintiff claimed were retaliation for his earlier complaints. See id. at 172.
140 Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
141 The provision’s language states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a).
134
135
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title IX does not
provide a private right of action for retaliation because the statutory
language does not include a specific provision prohibiting retaliation.142
By contrast, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed only eight
years before Title IX, contains a very specific anti-retaliation provision that
serves as the model for many modern retaliation protections.143 According
to the Birmingham Board of Education, Title VII demonstrated that
Congress knew how to write a specific anti-retaliation provision.144 The
absence of such a specific provision in Title IX meant that Congress must
have purposefully excluded retaliation protection from Title IX.145
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, reversed the Eleventh
Circuit, and found an implied claim for retaliation in Title IX.146 The Court
used three arguments to overcome the problem presented by Title IX’s
silence regarding retaliation. First, the Court asserted that
“discrimination” should be construed broadly to cover “a wide range of
intentional unequal treatment.”147 In other words, the Court found that
retaliation is discrimination “’on the basis of sex’ because it is an
intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex
discrimination.”148
Second, in an interesting twist on the defendant’s argument regarding
statutory silence, the Court noted that Title VII “is a vastly different
statute from Title IX,” because Title IX contains a general prohibition on
discrimination, while Title VII provides very specific examples of conduct
that constitutes unlawful discrimination.149 Thus, “[b]ecause Congress did
not list any specific discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its
failure to mention one such practice does not tell [the Court] anything
about whether it intended that practice to be covered.”150
142 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1344, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court
of Appeals also found that a Department of Education regulation prohibiting retaliation could not
create, on its own, a private right of action. See id. at 1346.
143 Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee who has “opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704, 78 Stat. 257, as amended, 86 Stat. 109, as codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a). Other anti-discrimination statutes provide anti-retaliation protection with similar
provisions based upon the language in Title VII. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 623(d); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203.
144 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175 (noting defendant’s argument).
145 See id.; see also id. at 190 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (comparing Title IX to Title VII’s explicit
anti-retaliation provision and asserting that the absence of a specific retaliation provision is
“significant”).
146 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171. Justice O’Connor authored the majority opinion. Justice Thomas
filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. See
id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175.
148 Id. at 174.
149 Id. at 175.
150 Id. at 175.
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Third, the Court relied upon Sullivan,151 an almost forty year-old case,
as precedent for interpreting a general prohibition on discrimination to
include a claim for retaliation.152 Although Justice Thomas, in a dissent
joined by three other Justices, claimed that Sullivan was a standing case
that merely permitted the white property owner to assert the claim of the
black tenant,153 the majority found that “Sullivan’s holding was not so
limited.”154 Rather, for the Jackson majority, Sullivan “plainly held that the
white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under § 1982
if he could show that he was ‘punished for trying to vindicate the rights of
minorities.’”155 Because the Court viewed Sullivan’s holding as implying a
claim of retaliation in a general discrimination statute, the Court found
that Congress likely intended the same interpretation for Title IX, which
was passed only three years after the Court decided Sullivan.156 Moreover,
not only did the Court hold that Title IX includes an implied claim of
retaliation, but also it relied upon Sullivan to find that the retaliation claim
protected both the original victims of discrimination as well as a thirdparty (like Coach Jackson) who complains about the original
discrimination.157 As Justice Thomas in dissent put it, the majority created
“an entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights holder, beyond the
claim of the original rights holder.”158
In two cases decided in 2008, the Court returned to the issue presented
by Jackson: whether a general anti-discrimination provision also provides
an implied claim of retaliation. The first case, CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries159 examined 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to determine if it “encompasses a
complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about a
violation of another person’s contract-related ‘right.’”160 Like Section 1982
in Sullivan and Title IX in Jackson, Section 1981 does not include an explicit
anti-retaliation provision; rather, the statute generally prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race in “mak[ing] and enforc[ing]
contracts.”161 Nevertheless, as in Sullivan and Jackson, the Supreme Court

396 U.S. 229 (1969).
See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176 (citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)).
153 See id. at 194-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that Sullivan cited to a standing case and
stated that there was “no question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain this action” (citing
Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237)).
154 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176 n.1.
155 Id. (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237).
156 See id. at 176.
157 See id. at 179-80 (noting that Sullivan “made clear that retaliation claims extend to those who
oppose discrimination against others”).
158 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159 553 U.S. 442, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
160 Id. at 1954. The employee in CBOCS West reported alleged discrimination against a coworker. See id.
161 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
151
152
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in CBOCS West found an implied claim of retaliation contained in this
general language.162
This time, unlike in Jackson, the Court did not debate the meaning of
Sullivan or whether a general anti-discrimination statute could include
specific protection from retaliation.163 Rather, the Court found that Jackson
definitively resolved those issues and, therefore, the CBOCS West holding
rested “in significant part upon the principles of stare decisis.”164 The fact
that the Court previously interpreted Section 1981 similarly to Section
1982 (at issue in Sullivan) only added to the stare decisis rationale.165
In some respects, CBOCS West represents even stronger support for
implied retaliation claims than Jackson. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito joined the Court between the Jackson and CBOCS West decisions,
which many commentators predicted would make the Court more
employer-oriented than the Jackson Court.166 Yet, despite these changes to
the Court’s composition, the Court decided CBOCS West with a sevenjustice majority that included Roberts and Alito,167 more than signed on to
the 5-4 Jackson decision.168
Moreover, in at least one way, the CBOCS West employee-plaintiff had
to overcome a stronger argument based on the statutory language of
See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954.
The Court accepted Jackson’s interpretation that Sullivan permitted a retaliation claim under
Section 1982. See id. at 1955. To overcome the defendant’s argument that the text of Section 1981 did
not explicitly include protection from retaliation, the Court also relied on Jackson’s interpretation
that Title IX encompassed retaliation claims even though it does not use the word “retaliation.” See
id. at 1958-59.
164 Id. at 1955.
165 See id. at 1955-56 (“While the Sullivan decision interpreted § 1982, our precedents have long
construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.”).
166 See, e.g., Editorial: Judge Alito’s Radical Views, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/opinion/23mon1.html (“Judge Alito has consistently
shown a bias in favor of those in power over those who need the law to protect them. Women,
racial minorities, the elderly and workers who come to court seeking justice should expect little
sympathy.”); National Women’s Law Center, Judge Alito Has Taken Positions That Would Undermine
Critical
Anti-Discrimination
Protections
For
Women,
available
at
www.nwlc.org/pdf/010306_JudgeAlitoSexDiscrimination.pdf (“[Alito] would act to weaken the
federal laws against discrimination in the workplace.”); John Kroger, Bench Brawl, SALON.COM (Oct.
31, 2005), available at http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2005/10/31/alito_reax
(noting Alito’s conservative record in employment cases); More Groups Announce Opposition to
Roberts (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.nominationwatch.org/judge_john_roberts/
(noting labor and union group opposition to Roberts); Michael Scherer, Why Big Business Hearts
John
Roberts,
SALON.COM
(Aug.
11,
2005),
available
at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/11/roberts_business; Alliance for Justice, Report
on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to the United States Supreme Court, at 3, available at
www.afj.org/afj_roberts_prehearing_report.pdf (“Judge Roberts’ apparent view of Congress’
authority potentially threatens a wide swath of legislation rooted in the Commerce Clause,
including civil rights safeguards, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, clean air, clean water,
and workplace safety protections.”).
167 Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito. See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice Thomas
wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Scalia. See id.
168 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 170.
162
163
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Section 1981 than the Jackson plaintiff had to address under Title IX.
Recent Congressional amendments to Section 1981 gave support to those
who argued that the statute did not protect employees from retaliation
because the amendments failed to address retaliation specifically. In 1989,
the Court held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union169 that the antidiscriminatory language of Section 1981 (“to make and enforce contracts”)
did not apply to “conduct by the employer after the contract relation has
been established, including breach of the terms of the contract or
imposition of discriminatory working conditions.”170 Although Patterson
did not specifically involve a retaliation claim, Courts of Appeals
interpreted Patterson to preclude retaliation claims under Section 1981,
because most retaliation victims will have opposed discriminatory
conduct after the formation of the contract, thus taking whistleblowing
employees out of Section 1981’s protective scope.171 Two years after
Patterson, Congress passed Section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991172 to
explicitly overrule the case by adding a new subsection (b) to Section 1981:
“For purposes of this section, the term ‘make and enforce contracts'
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship.”173 Notably, the amended
provision did not explicitly provide anti-retaliation protection.
The absence of anti-retaliation language in the 1991 amendments
presented more difficulty for the CBOCS West plaintiff than the statutory
silence in Title IX at issue in Jackson, for two reasons. First, immediately
before and after the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress enacted several very
specific anti-retaliation provisions in other employment statutes, such as
the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act,174 the 1993 Family and Medical
Leave Act,175 and the 1994 Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Act.176 Also, in 1994 Congress amended the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 to include explicit anti-retaliation
protection.177 In other words, Congress clearly knew how to enact an
explicit anti-retaliation provision and how to amend an older statute to
include one. However, Congress chose not to include a specific antiretaliation provision in its amendment of Section 1981, which could

491 U.S. 164 (1989).
Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
171 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1956-57 (listing Courts of Appeals cases barring retaliation
claims under Section 1981)
172 105 Stat. 1071.
173 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) & (b).
175 See 29 U.S.C. § 2615.
176 See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b).
177 See 49 U.S.C. § 31105.
169
170
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indicate a specific intent to exclude retaliation claims from Section 1981’s
coverage.
Second, by 1991, the Supreme Court had begun requiring courts to
construe statutory language strictly when determining whether an
implied right of action existed—a change from the judicial atmosphere in
1972 when Congress passed Title IX. Most immediately, two years before
Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act that amended Section 1981,
Patterson required such a narrow textual reading of Section 1981
specifically.178 More broadly, since 1975 in Cort v. Ash,179 the Court made
clear that it would focus its statutory interpretation efforts on legislative
intent, rather than the more permissive pre-Cort emphasis on legislative
purpose.180 Thus, even if Congress could have had Sullivan’s purportedly
broad reading of Section 1982 on its mind when it passed Title IX in 1972,
as Jackson concluded,181 Congress would have been under no illusion in
1991 that it needed to include in its statutes explicit language regarding
protection from retaliation.182 Thus, the primary statutory interpretation
argument utilized by the Court in Jackson held much less power when the
CBOCS West evaluated the changes the 1991 Civil Rights Act made to
Section 1981.
The Court dismissed these arguments, however, by pointing to the
1991 Act’s legislative history. A House Report indicated that the amended
provision would provide protection from a long list of employment
actions, including retaliation.183 Moreover, a footnote in the same Report
noted that the legislation would restore the right to sue for retaliation that
courts assumed Patterson had eliminated.184 Therefore, because the
purpose of the 1991 Act was to nullify Patterson, the Court concluded that
Congress also must have intended to “embrace pre-Patterson law,”
including Sullivan.185
178 See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 180-81 (noting that Section 1981 is “limited to the enumerated
rights within its express protection”).
179 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
180 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1131 (4th ed. 2007)
(noting that Cort v. Ash “marks a watershed in the legisprudence of implied causes of action. Before
Cort, private causes of action were usually implied; after Cort, usually not”); see also Humphries v.
CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 410 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part) (“[S]ince the
1970s the Court has lashed interpretation more closely to statutory text.”).
181 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176.
182 As Judge Easterbrook noted in dissent in the 7th Circuit case that led to the Supreme Court’s
CBOCS West decision: “There has been a sea change in interpretative method between Sullivan and
today-and Patterson not only exemplifies the change but also applies it to § 1981. . . . [W]hen § 1981
was amended in 1991, decisions such as Cort and Rodriguez and Patterson had announced a textual
approach.” See Humphries, 474 F.3d at 411 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting in part).
183 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1957 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, p. 92 (1991)).
184 See id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, pp. 92-93, n. 92 (1991)).
185 Id. at 1959. Adding to the anomalous nature of this conclusion, the Court recently held that
when Congress passed part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act to overturn another Court case, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), Congress did not adopt the law regarding burden of
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The Supreme Court’s second implied retaliation case in 2008, GomezPerez v. Potter,186 involved a provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)187 that addresses age discrimination
against federal employees (as opposed to private-sector employees).188
Section 15(a) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a), states that all employment
decisions affecting federal employees or applicants who are at least 40
years of age “shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.”189
As with the other implied retaliation cases addressed so far, the Court
decided that this general prohibition on discrimination included a claim
for retaliation.190 The Gomez-Perez majority conducted a relatively cursory
analysis: the ADEA contained general language banning discrimination
based on age; age is a similar protected category to race and sex; the Court
already implied retaliation claims from general language banning
discrimination based on race and sex (in Sullivan and Jackson,
respectively); therefore, an implied retaliation claim should be implied
from the ADEA’s general anti-discriminatory language.191
The majority’s quick syllogistic analysis and easy reliance on precedent
belie a deeper problem with a claim for retaliation under §633a(a). This
problem somewhat revisits the same issue the Section 1981 retaliation
claim in CBOCS West confronted regarding the 1991 Civil Rights Act. That
is, how should the Court interpret Congressional silence at a time when
Congress included clear anti-retaliation provisions in other statutes?192 In
Gomez-Perez, however, the circumstances surrounding Congressional
passage of the federal government sections of the ADEA presented an

proof in ADEA cases that existed prior to Price Waterhouse. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___
U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
186 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
187 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.
188 See 29 U.S.C. § 633a.
189 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a).
190 See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936. The plaintiff claimed that her employer retaliated against
her for filing an age discrimination complaint. See id. at 1935.
191 See id. at 1937. Justice Alito wrote the 6-3 decision. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting
opinion joined in part by Justices Thomas and Scalia, see id. at 1943 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and
Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia, see id. at 1951 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The Court stated:
Following the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson, we interpret the ADEA federalsector provision's prohibition of “discrimination based on age” as likewise
proscribing retaliation. The statutory language at issue here (“discrimination
based on age”) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson
(“’discrimination’ ” “ ‘on the basis of sex’ ”) and is the functional equivalent of
the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177, 125 S.Ct. 1497
(describing Sullivan as involving “discrimination on the basis of race”). And the
context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases;
that is, all three cases involve remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting
discrimination.
Id.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 172-80.
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even greater challenge to finding an implied claim for retaliation than the
Court faced in either Jackson or CBOCS West.193
When the ADEA originally passed in 1967, the Act applied only to the
private sector and included both an anti-discrimination provision and a
separate anti-retaliation provision.194 Seven years later, Congress passed
the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,195 which added 29 U.S.C. §
633a to the ADEA to prevent age discrimination against most Executive
Branch employees.196 However, Congress did not include a specific antiretaliation provision in the amendment covering federal workers—a
distinct difference between the amendment and the original ADEA
applicable to the private sector. Moreover, Congress clearly was aware of
the ADEA’s original provisions protecting private-sector employees from
discrimination and, separately, retaliation. As Chief Justice Roberts noted
in dissent,197 the amendments made these separate private-sector
provisions applicable to States and their political subdivisions, but
Congress enacted the separate section 633a (without a distinct antiretaliation provision) to apply to the federal government.198 A further
piece of evidence from the FLSA Amendments suggests that Congress
deliberately chose not to include a separate anti-retaliation provision in
the section of the ADEA applicable to federal employees. As part of the
Amendments, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to
extend the FLSA, including its anti-retaliation provision, to federal

193 See Charles Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007-2008 Supreme Court Term, 24 LAB. LAW.
147, 155-56 (2008) (noting that Gomez-Perez was a “harder retaliation case” than CBOCS West
because the ADEA private-sector provision had an anti-retaliation provision and because the case
presented a “weaker stare decisis argument”).
194 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602. Section 4(a)(1) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual . . .
because of such individual’s age.” Section 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), prevented retaliation against any
employee or applicant who “has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because
such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or litigation under” the ADEA.
195 88 Stat. 74.
196 See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1944 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
197 See id. at 1946 (“Congress obviously had the private-sector ADEA provision prominently
before it when it enacted § 633a, because the same bill that included § 633a also amended the
private-sector provision.”) (citing §28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74, which broadened the definition of
“employer” in 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)).
198 See id. at 1947. As the Chief Justice stated:
Congress specifically chose in the FLSA Amendments to treat States and the
Federal Government differently with respect to the ADEA itself. It subjected the
former to the ADEA’s private-sector provision—including the express
prohibition against retaliation in § 623(d)—while creating § 633a as a stand-alone
prohibition against discrimination in federal employment, without an
antiretaliation provision. This decision evinces a deliberate legislative choice not
to extend those portions of the ADEA’s private-sector provisions that are not
expressly included in § 633a . . . .
Id. at 1947-48 (citations omitted).
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employees.199 Again as Chief Justice Roberts argued in dissent, “Congress
did not similarly subject the Federal Government to the express
antiretaliation provision in the ADEA, strongly suggesting that this was a
conscious choice.”200
The majority, however, disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts regarding
the meaning of the dissimilar structure utilized by the private-sector and
the federal-sector provisions. In response to his criticism, the majority
again relied heavily on Sullivan, as it did in CBOCS West. The majority
claimed that when Congress enacted a “broad, general ban” on age
discrimination, “Congress was presumably familiar with Sullivan and had
reason to expect that this ban would be interpreted ‘in conformity’ with
that precedent.”201 Therefore, the fact that separate provisions of the
ADEA addressed retaliation differently “does not provide a sufficient
reason to depart from the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson.”202
2.

Explicit Protection: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

The year after Jackson, the Supreme Court turned to the explicit antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White203 required the Court to determine the type of adverse action
that qualifies as retaliation by an employer against an employee.204 In
many ways, the case provided a mirror image of Jackson. While Jackson
required the Court to find retaliation protection as an implicit part of a
broad anti-discrimination provision,205 Burlington Northern emphasized
that protection from discrimination differs from protection from
retaliation.206 For Jackson, retaliation was part of discrimination; for
Burlington Northern, retaliation required a separate analysis. Yet, in both
cases, the Court found in favor of protecting employees from retaliation.
The plaintiff in Burlington Northern claimed that her employer had
retaliated against her for complaining about gender discrimination by
taking two actions: first reassigning her to a position with less prestige
and more arduous responsibilities, and then later suspending her without
pay for 37 days (although the company later reinstated her with back
pay).207 To determine whether these actions violated Title VII’s anti199 See id. at 1947 (citing to FLSA Amendments, § 6(a)(2), 88 Stat. 58, which “explicitly subjected
federal employers to the FLSA’s express antiretaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)”).
200 Id.
201 See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1941; see also id. at 1942 n.6 (using same rationale to address the
argument related to Congress’ amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act to include an explicit
anti-retaliation provision applicable to federal employees).
202 See id. at 1941.
203 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
204 See id. at 59.
205 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174.
206 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-63.
207 See id. at 59, 71-72.
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retaliation provision, the Court had to determine the scope of the statute’s
provision barring an employer from “discriminat[ing] against” an
employee for opposing any practice made unlawful by Title VII or for
participating in a Title VII proceeding or investigation.208
Several Courts of Appeals had determined that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision should be read to prohibit only adverse actions
related to employment, which would be the same standard that courts
apply to actions that may violate Title VII’s anti-discrimination
provision.209 Others had taken an even more restrictive approach by
limiting actionable retaliation to “ultimate employment actions,” such as
“hiring, granting leave, discharging promoting, and compensating.”210
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Title VII required a
broader interpretation to prohibit not only employment-related
retaliation, but also actions unrelated to employment that could have an
impact on an employee’s willingness to report discrimination.211
The Court based its holding on the language and the purpose of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision.212 First, the language of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision differs from the statute’s anti-discrimination
provision. Title VII prohibits discrimination by prohibiting specific actions
related to employment: failing or refusing to hire or discharge,
discriminating with respect to an employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, or limiting employment
opportunities.213 The anti-retaliation provision, however, does not have
such limiting language. It prohibits an employer generally from
“discriminat[ing]” against employees or applicants in retaliation.214
See id. at 56-57.
See id. at 60 (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co. v. White, 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004);
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1300 (3rd Cir. 1997)).
210 Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) and citing Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.
1997)).
211 Id. at 57; see also id. at 67. The Court decided in favor of the employee with a 9-0 vote. Justice
Breyer wrote the majority opinion joined by seven other Justices. Justice Alito filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment only. See id. at 73 (Alito, J. concurring).
212 See id. at 62-63.
213 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The provision reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The provision reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because he has
208
209
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Second, the Court found that Congress intended these linguistic
differences to make a “legal difference” because the two provisions have
different purposes as well.215 Because the “substantive” antidiscrimination provision seeks to prevent discrimination in the workplace,
Congress needed only to prohibit acts related to employment. However,
the anti-retaliation provision aims to prevent discrimination by blocking
an employer from interfering with an employee’s effort to enforce the
statute’s substantive anti-discrimination objectives.216 To support this
objective, Title VII necessarily must prevent a broader range of employer
actions because of the various non-employment ways in which an
employer could deter employees from “[m]aintaining unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms.”217
Finally, the Court noted that, although the actionable retaliatory
conduct was broader than discriminatory conduct, it was not limitless.
The Court said that “it is important to separate significant from trivial
harms.”218 Thus, Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covers all employer
actions “that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable
employee or job applicant.”219 By “materially adverse,” the Court meant
that the employer action “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”220 This objective
standard recognizes that “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple
lack of good manners” would not be actionable because they would be
unlikely to deter employees from complaining to the EEOC about
discrimination.221
Using this standard, the Court found that both the retaliatory
reassignment and the unpaid suspension imposed by the employer in this
case violated Title VII because these actions would likely dissuade an
employee from bringing a charge of discrimination.222 Interestingly, as
Justice Alito noted in his concurrence, the Court might not have had to
issue as broad a holding in order to find that the employer’s conduct in
this specific case violated Title VII.223 Even Courts of Appeals that limited
the anti-retaliation protection to employment-related action likely would
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
215 See Burlington Northern, 544 U.S. at 62-63.
216 See id. at 63.
217 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
218 Id. at 68.
219 Id. at 57; see also id. at 67.
220 Id. at 57.
221 Id. at 68.
222 Id. at 70-73.
223 Id. at 79-80 (Alito, J., concurring).
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have found that the employer action in this case satisfied that standard.224
Nevertheless, in the face of significant differences among the Circuits as to
the scope of this provision, the Court decided to clarify the issue by
requiring a standard more protective of employees.
The Supreme Court’s most recent retaliation opinion, issued in 2009,
returned the Court to Title VII and its explicit anti-retaliation provision.
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.225 considered
whether Title VII’s retaliation provision protected an employee who
participated in an employer’s internal investigation of a sexual harassment
complaint.226 The employee had answered her employer’s questions and
identified several alleged instances of harassment that she had
witnessed.227
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects two types of conduct.
First, it prohibits retaliation against an employee who “has opposed”
violations of Title VII.228 Second, the statute protects an employee who
“has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.229 The Crawford
plaintiff argued that both Title VII’s “opposition” clause as well as its
“participation” clause prohibited retaliation against her based on her
conduct during her employer’s internal investigation.230
The Court evaluated the claim only under the opposition clause and
determined that the employee’s actions during the investigation
constituted protected conduct.231 The Sixth Circuit had viewed the
plaintiff’s conduct as insufficient because it believed Title VII required
“active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to warrant . . . protection against
retaliation.”232 Relying primarily on the “ordinary” meaning of the term
“oppose” found in the dictionary, however, the Supreme Court
disagreed.233 As with the Court’s other recent retaliation cases, this
conclusion is debatable; for example, the Circuit Courts of Appeal had
issued conflicting opinions regarding the extent to which Title VII’s antiretaliation provision requires “active” opposition.234 Moreover, the Court
See id.
129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
226 See id. at 849.
227 See id.
228 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
229 Id.
230 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
231 See id. at 853.
232 See id. at 851 (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn.,
211 Fed. Appx. 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 Fed.
Appx. 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233 See id. at 850 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 1710 (2d ed. 1958) for the
proposition that “RESIST frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE”).
234 Compare Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 211 Fed. Appx.
373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006) and McNorton v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 2007 WL 4481431, at *14 (N.D. Ga.
2007) (holding that an employee’s cooperation with internal investigation did not constitute
224
225
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could have chosen numerous other definitions of “oppose” that seem to
require much more active and overt resistance.235
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that not protecting employees like the
plaintiff would undermine the effectiveness of the scheme the Court had
implemented in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth236 and Faragher v. Boca
Raton,237 which encouraged employer internal investigations of sexual
harassment claims.238 Thus, according to the Court, Title VII’s opposition
clause goes beyond active opposition to protect any form of
communication to the employer in which the employee communicates a
belief that the employer has violated Title VII.239

B.

First Amendment Protection

In the midst of this series of cases addressing statutory anti-retaliation
protection, the Court also addressed the breadth of protection the First
Amendment provides to government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,240
the Court significantly limited the circumstances in which an employee
may claim protection from retaliation. The 5-4 Garcetti majority held that
the First Amendment does not protect employees from discipline related
to speech that was a part of an employee’s official duties.241
The Garcetti plaintiff, a deputy district attorney, informed his
supervisors in a memo that a sheriff’s affidavit being relied upon in a
criminal case contained “serious misrepresentations.”242 After a “heated”
meeting between the plaintiff and his supervisors about the plaintiff’s
conclusions, the supervisors decided to proceed with the prosecution
despite the plaintiff’s protests.243 Ultimately, the criminal defendant called
the plaintiff as a witness, and he reiterated his misgivings about the
sheriff’s affidavit.244 After the hearing, the plaintiff claimed the district
attorney’s office violated the First Amendment by retaliating against him
because of his memo.245
opposition conduct) with McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding
protection of employee’s “passive” opposition to discrimination).
235 See, e.g., McNorton, 2007 WL 4481431, at *13 (noting recent dictionary definitions that define
oppose with active terms); Br. for Resp., Crawford (No. 06-1595), available at 2008 WL 2066116, at *27
(same).
236 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
237 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
238 See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
239 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851.
240 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
241 See id. at 421. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer each filed a
dissent, and Justice Souter filed a third dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.
242 Id. at 414.
243 See id.
244 See id. at 414-15.
245 See id. at 415.
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In addressing the claim, the Court initially provided an exhaustive
review of its First Amendment jurisprudence and reiterated that it
required a delicate balancing of the employee’s interest in speaking out as
a citizen and the government employer’s interest in operational
efficiency.246 Importantly, the Court also identified a third interest that
must be balanced: the “public's interest in receiving the well-informed
views of government employees engaging in civic discussion.”247 As
summarized by the Court, its decisions “have sought both to promote the
individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as
citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of
government employers attempting to perform their important public
functions.”248
Within this framework, the Court found that the employee in Garcetti
acted pursuant to his job duties, which the Court interpreted to mean that
he was speaking as an employee rather than as a citizen.249 According to
the Court, this distinction meant that the government employer had more
discretion to control his speech and to discipline him if the employer
found the speech to be too disruptive or inaccurate.250 When the
“employee is simply performing his or her job duties,” the Constitution
does not require the same “delicate balancing” necessary when a
government employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern.251
The Court seemed attuned to at least one likely consequence of its
holding: that government employees will report misconduct less
frequently. Yet, despite recognizing that “[e]xposing governmental
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance,” the
Court ultimately asserted that encouraging employees to blow the whistle
was not necessarily the Constitution’s job.252 Instead, the Court pointed to
other potential safeguards, such as an employer’s “internal policies and
procedures that are receptive to employee criticism,” a “powerful network
of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor
codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing,” and attorney
rules of conduct.253
See id. at 417-19.
Id. at 419; see also San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (“Were [public
employees] not able to speak on [the operation of their employers], the community would be
deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the
public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S., 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale
disincentive to Government employees' expression also imposes a significant burden on the
public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”).
248 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419-20 (citations omitted) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73).
249 See id. at 421.
250 See id. at 422-23.
251 Id. at 423.
252 See id. at 426 (“Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of
action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”).
253 Id. at 425.
246
247
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Four justices dissented, writing three separate dissenting opinions.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent, which
argued for a different sort of balancing that placed more emphasis on
society’s interest in government employee speech. Although Justice Souter
recognized a government employer’s need to manage its work force, he
asserted that society’s interest “in addressing official wrongdoing and
threats to health and safety can outweigh the government [employer]'s
stake in the efficient implementation of policy.”254 Thus, when an
employee speaks on a matter of “unusual importance and satisfies high
standards of responsibility in the way he does it,” the fact that the speech
related to the employee’s job duties should not automatically exclude
protection.255 Justice Souter defined matters of “unusual importance” to
include “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other
serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”256 Justice Stevens
wrote a separate dissent in which he called the majority’s views
“misguided” because constitutional protection should not turn on
whether an employee’s words fell within the employee’s job
description.257 Finally, Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the majority’s
“job duty” rule was too categorical, and that some limited First
Amendment protection should still be provided to speech arising out of
an employee’s professional and constitutional obligations.258 Justice
Breyer, however, labeled as “too broad” Justice Souter’s exception for
employee speech on “matters of unusual importance,” and declared that
the exception caused too much judicial interference in government
employment matters.259

C.

The Anti-Retaliation Principle and the Recent Cases

Taken together, the six recent Court opinions dealing with retaliation
appear untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy. In Jackson, the
Court asserted that protection from retaliation was part of a statute’s
general anti-discrimination protection,260 while in Burlington Northern the
Court upheld broad retaliation protection because it was different than a
statute’s discrimination protection.261 The importance of stare decisis
controlled the outcome of CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez,262 while in

Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 435.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258 Id. at 446-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259 See id. at 448-49.
260 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174.
261 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-63.
262 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937.
254
255
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Jackson the Court ignored important precedent.263 The Court implied
broad retaliation protection when statutes were silent,264 yet refused to
imply narrower protection when examining the First Amendment.265
Although the Court typically emphasizes strict statutory interpretation
and Congressional intent, it broadly interpreted anti-retaliation statutory
provisions and examined Congressional purpose in Crawford and
Burlington Northern.266 In Crawford, the Court generously construed the
definition of the word “oppose,”267 while in Burlington Northern the Court
interpreted the phrase “discriminate against” to include actions taken
against employees that are unrelated to employment.268 Most
fundamentally, of course, the Court expanded retaliation protection in the
five statutory cases and greatly restricted it in the constitutional case.
The recent cases also present numerous surprises when viewed more
broadly against the Court’s non-retaliation cases. First, the employee won
five of the six retaliation cases, a rarity for this Court that often narrowly
construes employee protections in other contexts. For example, most
recently, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967269 required a substantially higher causation standard than
previously had been thought to apply.270 Additionally, in the last few
years, the Court severely limited the statute of limitations for
discrimination cases,271 restricted the application of the constitutional
Equal Protection Clause to public employees,272 and undermined Title
VII’s protection from disparate impact discrimination.273 Although
numbers do not tell the whole story,274 the win-loss record for employees

263 See generally Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171-84 (implying a right of action for Title IX, but not
mentioning Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court’s seminal case on implied rights of
action); id. at 177-78 (distinguishing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the case in which the
Court decided not to imply a disparate impact right of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, a sister statute to Title IX, see id. at 281).
264 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at
1935 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
265 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
266 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850 (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3); Burlington
Northern, 548 U.S. at 56-57 (interpreting Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3).
267 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
268 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 56-57.
269 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
270 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351-52 (2009).
271 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638-43 (2007). Congress
statutorily overturned this decision immediately after President Obama’s inauguration. See Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
272 See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156-57 (2008).
273 See Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664-65 (2009).
274 See Harkavy, supra note 4, at 2 (“For those who insist on keeping a scorecard, employees
appeared at first blush to fare better this [2007] term than last…. [However, w]hen viewed more
analytically than anecdotally, there was actually no such discernible shift in the Court's orientation
as an employer-friendly forum.“); Shanor, supra note 193, at 154 (“If this is a more conservative
Court, it did not show it in [CBOCS West].”).
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in retaliation cases conflicts with the conventional wisdom that this Court
generally favors business interests in employment cases.275
Second, many of the recent retaliation cases undermine long-standing
Supreme Court precedent. In particular, the implied retaliation cases
ignore the Court’s traditional reluctance to imply a right of action when a
statute does not explicitly provide for one. In the last few decades, the
Supreme Court has limited the ability of federal courts to imply private
rights of action by abandoning inquiry into a statute’s purpose.276 Rather,
federal courts must utilize basic statutory interpretation tools to examine
whether Congress specifically intended to create a right of action.277
Yet, in the face of this precedent, the Court went out of its way to
permit three claims for retaliation when no anti-retaliation provision
existed.278 As mentioned above, although the reliance on Sullivan may
have been appropriate in Jackson to discern Congressional intent when it
enacted Title IX, this rationale loses its force when applied to Section 1981
in CBOCS West and the ADEA in Gomez-Perez. Congress created the
statutory language at issue in both of these later cases during a period
when it also enacted numerous statutes with very specific anti-retaliation
provisions. It is unlikely that Congress relied on Sullivan’s vague holding
in 1974 when it enacted the ADEA or in 1991 when it amended the Civil
Rights Act, because Congress also included specific anti-retaliation
language in other legislation during that time. Moreover, when it enacted
the ADEA and the 1991 Amendments’ anti-discriminatory language of
275 See, e.g., Christine Cooper, Employment Cases from the 2006-2007 Supreme Court Term, 23 LAB.
LAW. 223, 224 (2008) (“Of course the Court has tilted to the right”); Michael Selmi, The Supreme
Court’s 2006-2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet But Revealing Term, 11 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J.
219, 220 (2007) (“The other patently obvious lesson this [2006-2007] term provided is that this is a
tough time for plaintiffs in the employment context.”); Ramona Paetzold, Supreme Court’s 20052006 Term Employment Law Cases: Do New Justices Imply New Direction?, 10 EMP. R. & EMP. POL’Y J.
303, at 348 (2006) (noting that after the 2005-2006 term, “preliminary indicia of a new conservatism
do exist”); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Express Skepticism in a Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2007, at A26; see also Robert Barnes, Decisions Indicate Supreme Court Moved Rightward This Term,
WASH.
POST
(July
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063004170.html?nav=emailpage (noting after the 20082009 term that the “path” of the Court is “clear: a patient and steady move to the right led by Chief
Justice John G. Roberts”).
276 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
277 See id.; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) (“While
some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying
private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a given
statute, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.” (citation omitted)); Karahalios v. Nat'l
Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989) (“Congress undoubtedly was aware from our
cases such as Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), that the Court had
departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of
action should be recognized, and that such issues were being resolved by a straightforward inquiry
into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action.”).
278 See, e.g., Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Retaliation’s Changing Landscape, 20 GEO. MASON UNIV. CIVIL
R. J. 143, 179-80 (2010).
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Section 1981, Congress certainly was aware that the Court required
specific language in order to recognize a private cause of action.279 This
legislative reality significantly undermines the Court’s conclusion that
Congress actually constructed a general anti-discrimination provision
without an anti-retaliation clause because it was relying on the Court’s
Sullivan opinion released years before.280 At a minimum, the fact that the
Court’s arguments present substantial problems should make
commentators question why the Court worked so hard to imply rights of
action for retaliation after years of reluctance to do so in any other case.
Third, for a Supreme Court that prides itself on closely adhering to
statutory language when interpreting the law,281 the recent Title VII
retaliation cases demonstrate the Court’s willingness to examine
Congressional purpose in addition to statutory language. For example,
Title VII itself gives little indication what exactly it prevents employers
from doing in retaliation: the statute prohibits only “discrimination.”282
Before Burlington Northern, many lower courts had held that this provision
should be read in pari materia with Title VII’s anti-discrimination
provision; in other words that they both address the same type of
employer action taken towards employees in the employment setting.283
The Supreme Court, however, refused to accept this standard canon of
statutory interpretation. After a cursory look at the differences between
the specific language in the anti-discrimination provision and the general
language in the anti-retaliation provision, the Court argued that Congress’
purpose when it enacted the anti-retaliation provision should guide the
interpretation of the statute.284 Similarly, Title VII’s use of the term
“oppose” does not have any inherent meaning as to the level of action
required to “oppose” unlawful conduct. The Court’s majority and
concurrence presented dueling dictionary definitions to support their
respective positions,285 but ultimately each had to fall back on their own

See Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 536.
Accord Harkavy, supra note 4, at 10 (noting in Gomez-Perez the “undeniable anomaly that
Congress provided an express remedy for retaliation against private employees, but did not do so
in similar terms for federal employees”).
281 See Arlington Central School District v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 303-04 (2006); Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567-71 (2005); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353,
359-60 (2005); see also Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d, 410 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting in part) (noting that these cases indicate the Supreme Court “insists that statutory
language be followed even if inconvenient or jarring”).
282 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
283 See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004);
Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286,
1300 (3rd Cir. 1997)).
284 See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 62-64 (“[P]urpose reinforces what language already
279
280

indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not
limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.”)
285

See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850; id. at 853-54 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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view of the provision’s purpose as well as the practical consequences of the
various interpretations of the word presented by each side.286
Commentators have had difficulty following the twists and turns.
Some commentators assert that the Court has returned to an earlier era in
which its goal is to divine Congressional intent and advance Congress’
purposes through the Court’s interpretation of statutes.287 Others
highlight and analyze the Court’s use of various canons of statutory
interpretation and judicially-created legal fictions.288 In a thoughtful article
after the Jackson opinion in 2005, Professor Deborah Brake provided a
well-reasoned argument that protection from retaliation was an implied
part of protection from discrimination.289
Other commentators view the decisions as little more than outcomedriven policy determinations in favor of retaliation protection; however,
they cannot agree on the meaning of the outcomes.290 For example,
Professor Richard Carlson has argued that the Court’s recent statutory
retaliation cases do not necessarily “signal a consistently sympathetic
judicial view” regarding retaliation against employees, in large part
because they all hue closely to specific statutory language.291 Indeed, he
dismissed these cases as “episodic expressions of support” that “belie a
persistent ambivalence” towards employees who suffer retaliation when
they advance the interest of the larger public good.292 In contrast, Daniel
Westman, a prominent practitioner and author,293 asserted that the Court
has been pro-employee in retaliation cases because “[j]udges do not like
the idea that witnesses are going to be intimidated and that translates into
the workplace.”294
See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852-53; id. at 854-55 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
See Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s Expanded
Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358,
394-95 (2008) (citing to Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)); cf. Shanor, supra note
193, at 172 (noting that the Court in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez “moved away from textual
statutory construction to more contextual or pragmatist approaches to statutory interpretation”).
288 See Leading Cases, Retaliation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 445, 451-55 (2008) (asserting that the
opinions in Gomez-Perez use rhetoric that appears to examine legislative intent but that in reality
utilize judicially-created legal fictions); Zehrt, supra note 278, at 153 (analyzing the three recent
implied retaliation cases and arguing that the court “has eschewed any reliance on public policy
and has chosen instead to base its decisions solely on statutory construction”).
289 See Brake, supra note 7, at 21-22.
290 See Leading Cases, Retaliation as Sex Discrimination, 119 HARV. L. REV. 357, 365-66 (2005)
(discussing Jackson and noting that “[t]o an optimist, Jackson is a valiant attempt by the judiciary to
patch an unfortunate statutory hole. To a pessimist, the case is a contemptible example of tenuous
reasoning chasing a desired policy outcome”).
291 See Carlson, supra note 7, at 244. Moreover, Professor Carlson contrasts the decisions in
Jackson and Burlington Northern with Garcetti. See id.
292 Id. at 240.
293 See generally WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118.
294 Marcia Coyle, Term’s Five Key Bias Decisions Were Mixed, NAT’L L.J. (July 6, 2009), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431973694&Terms_five_key_bias_decisi
ons_were_mixed_&slreturn=1 (quoting Westman). Of course, Westman’s conclusion does not
286
287
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Perhaps these decisions simply present examples of the Court deciding
the narrow issues of the cases before it: whether statutory language
contains an implied right of action or covers certain actions. Admittedly,
in each decision, the Court engaged in a discreet and nuanced
examination of the specific statutory language and structure involved in
each individual case. Indeed, to some the cases required only “careful
scrutiny of the particular provision in question,”295 which would keep
with the Court’s historic view limiting the instances in which it would
read a statutory provision broadly or to include an implied right of action.
However, a more comprehensive explanation is possible. Placing these
cases in the context of the Court’s other retaliation jurisprudence provides
a perspective that brings consistency and a sense of order to these
seemingly counter-intuitive results. When placed in this context, one
common theme can be discerned throughout the recent retaliation cases:
the Anti-Retaliation Principle. The Court recognized that enforcing the
law requires encouraging employees to provide information about
corporate misconduct. Anti-retaliation protection means enhanced law
enforcement, which the Court for fifty years has valued more than other
competing concerns. Indeed, in several ways, the recent retaliation cases
exemplify the Court’s long-standing acceptance of and adherence to the
same Anti-Retaliation Principle that the Court has utilized consistently in
the past.
As an initial matter, the implied retaliation cases rely heavily on the
holding of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,296 a case that, as mentioned
above, relies upon the Anti-Retaliation Principle to support its holding
that Section 1982 incorporates an implied right of action for retaliation.297
Indeed, all three of the recent implied retaliation cases pay homage to
Sullivan’s reference to the Principle.298
But, more than simply adopting Sullivan, the Court reinvigorated the
Anti-Retaliation Principle through these recent cases. Again, the AntiRetaliation Principle recognizes that law enforcement depends upon
employees blowing the whistle on illegal conduct—even if those
employees are not the victims of that conduct. In order to encourage them
to come forward, the law must protect them from retaliation. Notably, like
Sullivan, two of the three recent implied retaliation cases—Jackson and
explain the Garcetti Court’s reluctance to protect a person who was both an employee and a
witness.
295 Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1951 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 1939 (Alito, J.)
(“Jackson did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because the Court concluded as a policy
matter that such claims are important. Instead, the holding in Jackson was based on an
interpretation of the ‘text of Title IX.’” (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S., at 178)).
296 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
297 See discussion supra Part I; see also Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (finding that if an individual
could be “punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982,” then
“[s]uch a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property”).
298 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180; CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1955; Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936.
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CBOCS West—involved third-party reporters of illegal discrimination.299
The Jackson plaintiff reported inequities in the girls’ basketball program300
and the CBOCS West plaintiff reported alleged discrimination against a coworker.301 The Jackson Court made it clear that the victim of retaliation can
be (and often would be) different than the victim of the underlying
discrimination.302 For Title IX specifically, the Court found that Title IX’s
enforcement depended upon complaints, particularly from insiders with
first-hand knowledge about violations, such as teachers and coaches.303
Thus, the Jackson Court explicitly adopted the Anti-Retaliation
Principle:
If recipients [of federal education funds] were permitted to
retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination
would be loath to report it, and all manner of Title IX
violations might go unremedied as a result. . . . Reporting
incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement
and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who
report went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were not
prohibited, Title IX's enforcement scheme would unravel. . . .
Without protection from retaliation, individuals who
witness discrimination would likely not report it, . . . and the
underlying discrimination would go unremedied.”304
This adoption paved the way for the subsequent implied retaliation cases
to do the same for similar reasons. The CBOCS West Court upheld a
retaliation claim for Section 1981 in part because its sister statute, Section
1982, was held by Sullivan to provide “protection from retaliation for
reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory right.”305
Although the Anti-Retaliation Principle is not as explicit in Gomez-Perez,306
the Court did reject the government employer’s argument that protection
See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171; CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954; Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237.
See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.
301 See CBOCS West, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
302 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-80.
303 See id. at 181 (“[T]eachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position to
vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify discrimination and
bring it to the attention of administrators. Indeed, sometimes adult employees are ‘”the only
effective adversar[ies]’’’ of discrimination in schools.”) (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (citing
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953))).
304 Id. at 180-81.
305 CBOCS West, 129 S. Ct. at 1958 (emphasis in original).
306 The Court actually denied that it was making any policy-oriented determination in Jackson
when it mentioned the important role of teachers and students in reporting illegal discrimination.
See Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1939. The Court claimed it was merely responding to an argument
made in Jackson that “even if even if Title IX was held to permit some retaliation claims, only a
‘victim of the discrimination’-and not third parties-should be allowed to assert such a claim.” See id.
(quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-82).
299
300
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from retaliation is not necessary because third parties are not necessary to
identify age discrimination and report it.307
The Title VII cases also adopted the Anti-Retaliation Principle by
broadly interpreting the statute’s express anti-retaliation provision. First,
in Burlington Northern, the Court reiterated that the provision prevents
employers “from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”308
In short, the “primary purpose” of the provision is to maintain
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”309 Because of this
purpose, the Court held that the provision should be interpreted broadly
so that employers would be deterred from retaliating against employees
who might report wrongdoing.310 Citing back to the Court’s first
expression of the Anti-Retaliation Principle in Mitchell, the Court in
Burlington Northern explicitly relied upon the Principle again:
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation
of employees who are willing to file complaints and act as
witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be
expected if employees felt free to approach officials with
their grievances.” Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision
to provide broad protection from retaliation helps assure the
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act's
primary objective depends.311
Even when the Court declined to consider “petty slights, minor
annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” to be actionable
retaliation, the Anti-Retaliation Principle guided the Court’s rationale.
Allowing such de minimus harms would not prevent “unfettered access” to
Title VII’s remedial mechanisms because those trivial acts would not
reasonably deter an employee from reporting discrimination.312 By
focusing on the Anti-Retaliation Principle—i.e., enhancing law
enforcement by encouraging employees to blow the whistle on
illegalities—the Court limited actionable retaliatory acts to those that
“could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.”313

See id. at 1938-39.
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63.
309 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
310 See id.
311 Id. at 67 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)) (citation
omitted).
312 Id. at 68.
313 Id. at 57; see also id. at 68.
307
308
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The Court even modified its seemingly objective perspective on which
actions would be “material.” By permitting some attention to be paid to
whether an action would dissuade a reasonable person “in the plaintiff’s
position,”314 the Court allowed for the introduction of individualized
factors that might dissuade one type of person but not another from
reporting. This permissible subjectivity highlights the importance of
encouraging employees to report misconduct. Ultimately, although the
Court wanted to “screen out trivial conduct,” its focus was on the AntiRetaliation Principle: preventing “those acts that are likely to dissuade
employees from complaining or assisting in complaints about
discrimination.”315
The second Title VII case, Crawford, also emphasized the importance of
the Anti-Retaliation Principle because of the Court’s recognition of the
important role employee whistleblowers play in enforcing Title VII. As in
Sullivan, Jackson, and CBOCS West, the plaintiff in Crawford was more of a
reporter of discrimination than a victim asserting her own rights.316 Indeed,
the Court made explicit its understanding that employees who report
discrimination against others may face retaliation even when the
whistleblower was not personally discriminated against.317
As important, after its discussion of various dictionary meanings of the
word “oppose,” the Crawford Court focused on the primary policy
justification for protecting employees who participate in internal
corporate investigations. This policy rationale involved yet another
restatement of the Anti-Retaliation Principle:
If it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination in answering an employer's questions could
be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would
have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses
against themselves or against others. This is no imaginary
horrible given the documented indications that “[f]ear of
retaliation is the leading reason why people stay silent
instead of voicing their concerns about bias and
discrimination.”318

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
316 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849. The plaintiff actually suffered as a victim of sexual
harassment, but reported her supervisor’s illegal conduct only during an investigation of
unspecified rumors regarding sexual harassment by the supervisor. See id.
317 See id. at 853 n.3 (“[E]mployees will often face retaliation not for opposing discrimination
they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not
‘victims’ of anything until they are retaliated against. . . .”).
318 Id. at 852 (quoting Brake, supra note 7, at 20).
314
315
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Therefore, the five recent statutory retaliation cases reflect the same
three premises supporting the Anti-Retaliation Principle that the Court
has utilized for almost fifty years. First, the Court recognized that
employees often have the best information about wrongdoing committed
by an employer—a fact underscored by the plaintiffs in these cases, two of
whom reported illegal conduct that was not directed at them.319 Second, as
Crawford, Burlington Northern, and Jackson all recognized explicitly,
employees will only come forward with this inside information if they are
protected from retaliation.320 Third, as Jackson, Burlington Northern, and
Crawford made clear, effective law enforcement requires employees to
report illegal conduct.321
This explanation explains these five recent statutory cases better than
focusing solely on an argument that retaliation is another form of
discrimination.322 Granted, language in the implied retaliation cases
supports this position, particularly in Jackson in which the majority makes
this “retaliation equals discrimination” argument explicitly.323 However,
this rationale does not explain Congress’ frequent practice of providing
separate protection from retaliation in anti-discrimination laws.324 Nor
does it provide insight for interpreting anti-retaliation provisions in laws
addressing problems other than discrimination.325 Perhaps another way to
say the same thing (but in not as limited a fashion) is to assert that a law
preventing discrimination must, by definition, also prevent retaliation for
reporting discrimination. In other words, for a law to be enforced,
retaliation against those who report violations of it must be prevented.
Framed in this manner, retaliation law is not limited by its association
with discrimination; rather, discrimination law is merely one area in
which anti-retaliation protection is needed in order to enforce the law.
Viewed from this perspective, Jackson, CBOCS West, and Gomez-Perez do
not mean that the Court will imply retaliation protection only in
discrimination cases. Instead, they could mean that discrimination claims
present only one example of the types of claims that also need antiretaliation protection in order to be enforced effectively. Of course, the
319 See CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181. Moreover, a third employee,
Crawford, was a victim of discrimination but reported the discrimination during her employer’s
investigation of her supervisor’s actions more generally. See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
320 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81.
321 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180-81; Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68.
322 Cf. Brake, supra note 7, at 21-22.
323 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174; cf. CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1960-61 (rejecting the dissent’s
argument that retaliation and discrimination are distinct); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937 (noting
that argument that retaliation and discrimination are conceptually different “did not prevail” in
Jackson).
324 See Equal Employment Opportunity Act (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Americans With
Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
325 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660.
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Court’s further focus on retaliation in the Title VII discrimination context
merely provides another example of a law in which retaliation protection
is needed in order for the law to be enforced. In those cases, however, the
protection was explicit rather than implicit, and the issues involved how
broadly to read that protection.
Moreover, in the context of the Court’s other retaliation jurisprudence,
the Court’s recent statements related to the broader Anti-Retaliation
Principle become meaningful. Over the course of the last fifty years, the
Court has made these same types of statements in cases involving a
variety of topics in addition to discrimination. As noted above, the Court
utilized the Principle by upholding broad retaliation protection in cases
involving the First Amendment,326 wage claims,327 labor relations,328
environmental regulations,329 transportation industry rules,330 and witness
testimony.331 The Court’s protection of whistleblowers goes well beyond
those who report only discrimination. In each of those instances, the
Court’s rationale relates to the importance of these employees’ reports for
law enforcement efforts more generally.
In seeming juxtaposition to the approach the Court took in the
statutory cases, the result in the lone First Amendment decision
substantially narrowed retaliation protection. Indeed, the Court’s 2006
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos332 provided the first example of the Court
denying First Amendment protection to an employee who complained
about arguably illegal conduct.333 As noted above, although the
employee’s speech (the complaint about illegal behavior) related to a
“matter of public concern” (illegal conduct), the Court held that the First
Amendment did not protect the employee from retaliation because the
speech was part of the employee’s job duties.334
To a limited degree, however, Garcetti provides yet another example of
the Court explaining anti-retaliation protection through the lens of the
Anti-Retaliation Principle. At the same time that the Court implemented a
rule that undermined the Principle, the Garcetti Court also made explicit
statements in support of the Principle. For example, the Court identified
326

See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 572

(1968).

See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292-93 (1960).
See NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972); Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 744 (1983); Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984).
329 See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990).
330 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994); Brock v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1987).
331 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998).
332 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
333 The employee in Garcetti reported “government misconduct” that included alleged perjury
in the form of an affidavit the employee believed to contain “serious misrepresentations.” See id. at
414-16.
334 See id. at 421-23.
327
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the importance of balancing the employee and employer interests with the
“public's interest in receiving the well-informed views of government
employees engaging in civic discussion.”335
That said, the Court seems to have strayed from the Anti-Retaliation
Principle in this case because, despite giving lip service to consideration of
society’s interest in employee speech,336 it weighed heavily the employer’s
need for managerial control over its workforce and provided no actual
discussion of the weight to be given to society’s specific interest in law
enforcement.337 The Anti-Retaliation Principle normally would call for the
protection of an employee who reports illegal conduct, even if that
reporting was part of the employee’s job duties. Job duties would make no
doctrinal difference if the Court truly focused on the Anti-Retaliation
Principle in the decision. A rule more consistent with the Principle
articulated in the rest of the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence would
recognize that speech related to illegal government conduct lies at the
heart of First Amendment protection. Society’s interest in knowing about
the government’s unlawful behavior should be weighed heavily in favor
of protection from retaliation, particularly because, like the other contexts
discussed above, government employees have unique access to
information about illegalities.
In his dissent in Garcetti, Justice Souter set out a rule that more
appropriately incorporates the Anti-Retaliation Principle into the Court’s
Pickering balancing. Justice Souter argued that “private and public
interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and
safety can outweigh the government [employer’s] stake in effective
implementation of policy.”338 When employee speech relates to job duties,
typically the government’s need for managerial authority would outweigh
the First Amendment interests at stake.339 However, according to Justice
Souter, when the employee “speaks on a matter of unusual importance
and satisfies high standards of responsibility in the way he does it,” the
employee should be protected.340 Justice Souter defined “a matter of
335 Id. at 419; see also id. at 419-20 (stating that its decisions “have sought both to promote the
individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of
public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their
important public functions”) (citations omitted) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73); cf. San Diego
v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (“Were [public employees] not able to speak on [the
operation of their employers], the community would be deprived of informed opinions on
important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public's interest in receiving informed
opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it” (citation omitted)); United States v.
Treasury Employees, 513 U.S., 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale disincentive to Government
employees' expression also imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear
what the employees would otherwise have written and said”)).
336 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419-20.
337 See id. at 422-23.
338 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
339 Id. at 435.
340 Id.
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unusual importance” to include speech related to “official dishonesty,
deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats
to health and safety.”341 His examples of such speech relate to reports of
illegal conduct, including when “a public auditor speaks on his discovery
of embezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an
obligatory report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement
officer expressly balks at a superior's order to violate constitutional rights
he is sworn to protect.”342 In other words, Justice Souter agreed with the
job duty rule generally, but understood it should be limited because of the
Anti-Retaliation Principle’s protection of speech related to law
enforcement, even if the speech was part of one’s job duty. Justice Souter’s
exception for employee reports of illegal government behavior would
better comply with the Court’s long history of support for the AntiRetaliation Principle.
Importantly, Garcetti ultimately confirms the Court’s belief that the
Anti-Retaliation Principle should be implemented by Congress, not by the
Court through constitutional interpretation. One of the reasons the Court
offered to support its Garcetti holding was that there existed a “powerful
network of legislative enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws
and labor codes-available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.”343
Indeed, the Court has used a similar justification for reduced First
Amendment protection in the employment setting. In Waters v.
Churchill,344 the Court noted that legislatures could create stronger antiretaliation protections “beyond what is mandated by the First
Amendment, out of respect for the values underlying the First
Amendment, values central to our social order as well as our legal
system.”345 Also, in Bush v. Lucas,346 the Court specifically denied a First
Amendment damages claim to federal employees because Congress had
created statutory protections from retaliation under the Civil Service
Reform Act.347 Thus, the constitutional cases linguistically support the
Anti-Retaliation Principle, but also they often demonstrate the Court’s
understanding that it is primarily a statutory, not a constitutional,
principle.
In sum, all the recent retaliation cases demonstrate that the Supreme
Court’s retaliation jurisprudence is about law enforcement. Employees
must be protected from retaliation so that they will report illegal conduct.
Id.
Id. at 434.
343 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
344 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
345 Id. at 674 (1994).
346 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
347 See id. at 389 (“In the past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level
government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might
improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates' freedom of expression.”)
341
342
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These employee reports will themselves aid law enforcement by alerting
authorities to wrongdoing. As important, the threat of possible employee
reports will deter violations of the law in the first place. That being said,
the Garcetti opinion seems to confirm the Court’s long-standing view that
this anti-retaliation protection more appropriately arises out of statutory,
rather than constitutional, law.

III. The Future
Identifying and explaining the Supreme Court’s rationale in retaliation
cases should impact how the Supreme Court and lower courts approach
retaliation law in the future.

A.

The Supreme Court

First, and most immediately, the Supreme Court appears interested in
continuing its recent examination of retaliation law. The Court recently
granted certiorari in two more statutory retaliation cases: Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastic Corp.348 and Thompson v. North American
Stainless, LP.349 The Anti-Retaliation Principle could directly influence the
outcome of these important cases.
Kasten involves the question of whether the Fair Labor Standard Act’s
anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who files an oral
complaint that an employer violated the FLSA.350 In the lower courts, the
issue turned on how to interpret the FLSA’s protection of an employee
who “has filed any complaint.”351 Both the District Court and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found that this statutory language protects only
a written complaint, not an oral complaint.352 However, decisions by
several other circuit courts have protected employees who made oral
complaints about FLSA violations.353
Thompson examines whether Title VII prohibits retaliation against an
employee by “inflicting reprisals” on a third-party who is closely related
to the employee.354 In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he was fired
130 S. Ct. 1890, No. 09-834 (March 22, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
130 S. Ct. 3542, No. 09-291 (June 29, 2010) (granting petition for writ of certiorari).
350 See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp., No. 09834, 2010 WL 146471 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2010).
351 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d
834, 837-40 (7th Cir. 2009); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp.2d 608,
611-12 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
352 See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840; Kasten, 619 F. Supp.2d at 613.
353 See, e.g., EEOC v. Romeo Community Schools, 976 F.2d 985, 989-90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v.
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 125 (8th
Cir. 1987).
354 Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at i, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291, 2009 WL
2876195 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2009).
348
349
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because his fiancé engaged in conduct protected by Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.355 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky entered summary judgment in favor of the employer,
concluding that Title VII “does not permit third-party claims.”356 A Sixth
Circuit panel reversed the District Court,357 but then a divided en banc
Circuit over-turned the panel’s decision.358 The majority pointed out that
Title VII’s retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an
employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”359 Relying on what it
viewed to be the “plain and unambiguous statutory text” of Title VII’s
retaliation provision, the court found that Title VII protects only
individuals who themselves engaged in protected conduct.360 Because
Thompson did not engage in the protected conduct himself, he could not
bring a retaliation claim based on his own discharge.361
At first glance, both cases present relatively pedestrian statutory
interpretation issues. In Kasten, the Court must decide between competing
interpretations of the statutory terms “file” and “complaint.” In their
briefs, the two sides each offered several examples of various dictionary
definitions of the terms to support their arguments.362 Moreover, each side
presented the Court with language from numerous other statutes that lead
to one conclusion or the other about the scope of the provision’s
protection.363
Similarly, Thompson ostensibly presents two competing interpretative
views of Title VII’s language. As the Sixth Circuit and other circuits have
found, the Title VII’s retaliation provision focuses on discrimination
against the person (“he”) who has opposed unlawful activity or
355 See id. at 3 (alleging that Plaintiff’s fiancé filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission).
356 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp.2d 633, 639 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
357 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated by Thompson
v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 07-5040, 2008 WL 6191996 (6th Cir. July 28, 2008).
358 See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009). Nine judges joined
in the majority opinion, one judge delivered a separate concurrence, and six judges filed a total of
three dissenting opinions. See id.; id. at 816 (Rogers, J., concurring); id. at 818 (Martin, J., dissenting);
id. at 820 (Moore, J., dissenting); id. at 826 (White, J., dissenting).
359 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 807 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
360 Id. at 805.
361 See id. at 807-08.
362 Petitioner’s Brief, at 22 & 22 n.10; 22 n.11, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6,
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
363 Petitioner’s Brief, at 24-30, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1890 (2010) (No. 09-834); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 6, Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp., at 8-9, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010) (No. 09-834).
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participated in Title VII activities.364 However, another interpretation of
Title VII’s “plain language” could led to a dramatically different result. In
her dissenting opinion in Thompson, Judge White noted that the antiretaliation provision merely describes an “unlawful employment
practice.”365 It does not identify who receives protection from such
practices.366 Instead, Title VII answers that second question in a different
section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which provides that any person who claims
to be “aggrieved” by an employer’s unlawful employment practice can
file a claim with the EEOC.367 Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
permits lawsuits to be filed “by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”368
Thus, under White’s analysis of the statutory text, North American
Stainless committed an unlawful employment practice by retaliating
against Thompson’s fiancé through its firing of Thompson.369 Because
Thompson was “aggrieved” by this act, §2000e-5 permits Thompson to file
a claim against North American Stainless.370 In his Supreme Court
briefing, Thompson has adopted this statutory argument as his primary
rationale for overturning the Sixth Circuit’s decision.371

364 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 807-08; Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir.
2002) (analyzing similar language in the ADA and ADEA, and concluding that “[r]ead literally, the
statutes are unambiguous-indeed, it is hard to imagine a clearer way of specifying that the
individual who was discriminated against must also be the individual who engaged in protected
activity”); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (looking to “plain
language” of Title VII to resolve issue); Holt v. JTM Indus., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996)
(examining the “plain language” of the ADEA).
365 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827 (White, J., dissenting) (examining 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 and §
2000e-5(b)).
366 See id.
367 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827. Interestingly, Judge Rogers’
concurrence reached a similar conclusion about the relationship between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e5(b), except Rogers interpreted § 2000e-5(b) to permit only “persons who are the intended
beneficiaries” of Title VII to bring claims, which he stated would not include third-parties. Id. at 817
(Rogers, J., concurring).
368 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
369 See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 828 (White, J., dissenting).
370 See id.
371 See Petitioner’s Brief, at 7-9, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291, 2010 WL
3501186 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2010). Interestingly, the courts that have upheld third-party claims prior to
Thompson typically have ignored this statutory argument and relied on an analysis of the broad
purpose of anti-retaliation provisions. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[A] literal interpretation [of the Title VII § 704(a)] would leave a gaping hole in the
protection.”); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding third-party
claim under ERISA because a more narrow construction “clashes with the congressional intent of
protecting . . . the exercise of rights under an ERISA plan”); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d
1086, 1088-89 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding that the NLRA prohibited retaliation against third-parties
because otherwise protected employees will not exercise their rights for “feat that if they do the
company will try to get back at them in any way it can, including firing their relatives”); De
Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580-81 (D.D.C. 1978) (noting that not protecting a thirdparty under Title VII would produce “absurd results”); see also John J. Feeney, An Inevitable
Progression in the Scope of Title VII’s Anti-retaliation Provision: Third-Party Retaliation Claims, 38 CAP.
U. L. REV. 643, 655 (2010).

51

THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTI-RETALIATION PRINCIPLE
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2011)
In short, as with the other recent retaliation cases, both Kasten and
Thompson will require the Court to choose between strong linguistic and
statutory interpretation arguments on either side.372 Despite the claims of
judges and advocates on either side of these debates, the “plain language”
of the FLSA and Title VII simply do not answer the questions these cases
present. Ultimately, then, the Anti-Retaliation Principle may tip the
balance, as it did in Jackson, Burlington Northern, CBOCS West, Gomez-Perez,
and Crawford, in which similarly strong interpretative arguments could be
made regarding the applicability of retaliation protection. As in those
cases, older retaliation precedent examining the purpose of anti-retaliation
protections should loom large.
With regard to Kasten, fifty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that,
consistent with the Anti-Retaliation Principle, the purpose of the FLSA
anti-retaliation provision was to encourage employees to report violations
of the law:
For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not
seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards
through continuing detailed federal supervision or
inspection of payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information
and complaints received from employees seeking to
vindicate rights claimed to have been denied. . . . By the
proscription of retaliatory acts . . . Congress sought to foster
a climate in which compliance with the substantive
provisions of the Act would be enhanced.”373
Enforcement of the law relies upon employees to report FLSA violations,
which requires broad anti-retaliation protection.374 Moreover, in NLRB v.
Scrivener,375 decided almost forty years ago, the Court relied upon the
Principle to interpret a similar provision of the National Labor Relations
Act to protect employees who gave informal statements to an investigator,
even though the NLRA’s plain language seemed to limit protection to an
employee who “has filed charges or given testimony.”376 The Scrivener
Court decided to do exactly what the employee in Kasten asks the Court to
do now: understand the importance of protecting employees during all
phases of the enforcement process, including the initial report of illegality,
and therefore look beyond the statute’s plain, but limited, language.377

See discussion supra Part II.A.
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
374 See id.
375 405 U.S. 117 (1972).
376 See id. at 121 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)).
377 See id. at 124.
372
373
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Additionally, failing to protect oral complaints could significantly
impact the effectiveness of a decade-long attempt to encourage employees
to report illegal conduct through the use of employee hotlines.378 This
recent trend involves employers providing employees a consistent way to
make internal complaints about illegal behavior.379 As two prominent
academics have noted, “if internal disclosures are not protected, reporting
of wrongdoing would be reduced as unaddressed retaliation deters
potential whistleblowers and leads to the laws not being as effectively
enforced.”380 Indeed, protecting oral internal reports makes sense if the
goal is to increase reporting. Social science studies, for example, suggest
that most reports of wrongdoing begin as internal reports.381 The Supreme
Court has been protective of internal reports as well. In addition to
Crawford, which focused on the issue,382 the Court has noted in the
constitutional context that the First Amendment will protect internal
reports as well as external whistleblowing.383 In fact, federal courts and
the Secretary of Labor have interpreted other statutes to protect internal
whistleblowers, even when the statute’s language appears to protect only
external whistleblowers.384
More specifically, providing methods to orally report wrongdoing has
become part of the law enforcement landscape that encourages internal
reporting of wrongdoing.385 Congress and administrative agencies have
required companies to provide employees a means to report illegal
conduct.386 Indeed, most companies, spurred by these laws and court
rulings, provide telephone hotlines for employees to orally report a broad
range of wrongdoing, including both illegal and unethical conduct.387
Thus, it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to think only about
protecting the formal initiation of a complaint directly with a law
378 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1138-41.
379 See id.; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 281 (1991)
(noting that courts protect internal whistleblowers because “employees who uncover potential
health and safety problems are likely first to call these to the attention of management.”).
380 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 379, at 281.
381 See id. at 299; Moberly, supra note 378, at 1142.
382 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
383 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (“Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment
protection for expressions made at work.”); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. 410,
414 (1979) (protecting employee who complained to supervisor about discrimination).
384 See, e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474, 478479 (3rd Cir. 1993) (interpreting the Clean Water Act’s protection of employees who participate in a
“proceeding” to protect employees who make internal complaints to their corporate employer);
KOHN, supra note 26, at 251 (noting that the Secretary of Labor “adheres to its longstanding doctrine
that internal whistleblowing is fully protected” in environmental and nuclear whistleblowers
cases).
385 See Moberly, supra note 378, at 1138-41, 1151.
386 See Moberly, supra note 133, at 988-95.
387 See id.
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enforcement agency. In fact, the Seventh Circuit itself recognized this
reality in Kasten by noting that, despite the FLSA’s language, written
complaints to an employer (as opposed to just to the government) would
be protected conduct.388 The circuit court did not draw a distinction
between internal and external complaints; rather, the court distinguished
between written and oral complaints to an employer.
However, the Supreme Court has never been interested in such
nuanced and nitpicky distinctions when evaluating anti-retaliation
provisions, particularly in older retaliation statutes, because such
distinctions undermine enforcement of the law.389 Given the increased
importance of internal reporting, and the encouragement of oral internal
reporting through the pervasive use of employee hotlines, failing in Kasten
to protect employees who make oral reports of wrongdoing would
severely hamper FLSA law enforcement efforts. The FLSA, in particular,
relies upon employee reports for its enforcement,390 and an employee can
play an essential part in the Act’s enforcement through oral as well as
written action.391 For example, the Department of Labor advertises a
phone number for employees to call with concerns about FLSA violations,
explicitly encouraging oral reports and complaints.392
The Sixth Circuit’s cramped reading of Title VII in Thompson also will
undermine law enforcement (and thus the Supreme Court’s AntiRetaliation Principle). During the past half-century, the Court consistently
has permitted a wide range of plaintiffs to bring retaliation lawsuits
because the Court recognized the devastating deterrent effect retaliation
can have on a person’s willingness to report illegal conduct. Most
See Kasten, 570 F.3d at 837-38.
As the Court noted in Scrivener:
An employee who participates in a Board investigation may not be called
formally to testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could
testify. His contribution might be merely cumulative or the case may be settled
or dismissed before hearing. Which employees receive statutory protection
should not turn on the vagaries of the selection process or on other events that
have no relation to the need for protection. It would make less than complete
sense to protect the employee because he participates in the formal inception of
the process (by filing a charge) or in the final, formal presentation, but not to
protect his participation in the important developmental stages that fall between
these two points in time. This would be unequal and inconsistent protection and
is not the protection needed to preserve the integrity of the Board process in its
entirety.
Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 123-24; see also Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851 (broadly construing the opposition
clause of Title VII to include participating in an internal investigation).
390 See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292.
391 Kasten, 585 F.3d 310, 317 (7th Cir. 2009) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (“Oral inquiries, protests, and
information supplied to an agency representative play no less an important role in the statutory
scheme than do letters, e-mails, and sworn statements. They must be protected as well.”).
392
The Wage and Hour Division call center phone number is displayed at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/contact_us.htm and on posters that the law requires to be displayed in
workplaces. See Dep't of Labor Wage and Hour Division, FLSA Minimum Wage Poster, http://
www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/posters/flsa.htm.
388
389
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obviously, as noted above,393 the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil394
relied on the purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision to conclude that
the statute protected former employees as well as current employees.395
Without this protection, the Supreme Court recognized that victims of
discrimination would be deterred from complaining to the EEOC.396 In
fact, many retaliation statutes contain vague language about the scope of
the individuals they protect, and the Court has interpreted them to enable
a broad range of individuals to bring retaliation claims, including third
parties who report statutory violations,397 at-will employees,398 elected
union officials against their union,399 and illegal aliens.400 In each instance,
the Court’s holding demonstrated its understanding that enforcing these
laws depended upon providing anti-retaliation protection to a broad
range of individuals.
It is not a far leap from protecting individuals who might report
misconduct to protecting the relatives and friends of those who report.
Indeed, courts seem to understand that an effective way to chill reporting
would be for employers to retaliate against people close to those
reporting. As noted by the Seventh Circuit—and often repeated by
others401—“[t]o retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his family
is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the field of labor
relations.”402 Even courts that ultimately dismiss third-party claims based
on Title VII’s “plain language” have accepted this reality. For example,
after rejecting a third-party ADEA claim, the Third Circuit noted that
[t]he anti-retaliation provisions recognize that enforcement
of anti-discrimination laws depends in large part on
employees to initiate administrative and judicial
See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
519 U.S. 337 (1997).
395 See id. at 345-46 (noting “a primary purpose of anti-retaliation provisions” is “[m]aintaining
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms”).
396 See id. at 346.
397 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
1982).
398 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), which
prevents “intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings,” includes
protection for at-will employees).
399 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Intern’l v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (interpreting LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 412).
400 See Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895-96 (1984) (holding that reporting undocumented
aliens employees to law enforcement authorities was an unfair labor practice under the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3), when done in retaliation for participating in union
activities).
401 See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568-69 (3d Cir. 2002); Kenrich
Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 410 (3d Cir. 1990); Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s
Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV.
931, 932 (2007).
402 NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987).
393
394
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proceedings. There can be no doubt that an employer who
retaliates against the friends and relatives of employees who
initiate anti-discrimination proceedings will deter employees
from exercising their protected rights. . . . Allowing
employers to retaliate via friends and family, therefore,
would appear to be in significant tension with the overall
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions, which are
intended to promote the reporting, investigation, and
correction of discriminatory conduct in the workplace.403
Protecting third-party victims of retaliation would follow easily from the
Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle, particularly as the Court applied the
Principle in Burlington Northern and in Robinson. The Supreme Court
already recognized in Burlington Northern that retaliation can take many
forms, and thus that the law should prohibit a wide range of retaliatory
activity.404 Moreover, Robinson recognized that Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision must protect people other than “employees” in order to be
effective.405
Kasten and Thompson will give the Court further opportunities to apply
the Anti-Retaliation Principle and to enhance employee law enforcement
efforts. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases could have
broad implications because several federal laws contain anti-retaliation
provisions with similar language to the FLSA and Title VII.406 If the
Supreme Court continues its historic and recent reliance on the AntiRetaliation Principle, then it should reverse the lower courts’ limited
views of retaliation protection because their decisions weaken law
enforcement efforts.

B.

Lower Courts

The Anti-Retaliation Principle can serve a second important role,
directed at lower courts. The Principle’s emphasis on law enforcement
provides lower courts the proper perspective from which to evaluate
403 Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569. But see Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding that protecting third-parties who did not engage in protected activity is not
necessary to advance goals of anti-retaliation provision).
404 See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57.
405 See Robinson,
406 For statutes with language similar to the FLSA language at issue in Kasten, see Federal
Sector Labor Management Relations Program, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(4); Foreign Service LaborManagement Relations, 22 U.S.C. § 4115(a)(4); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §
660(c)(1); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a); Employee
Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002(4)(A); Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2934(f);
Railway Labor Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(3); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. §
31105(a)(1)(A)(i). For statutes with language similar to the Title VII language at issue in Thompson,
see Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140; Americans With Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).
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retaliation cases. Rather than view retaliation cases as a one-on-one battle
of an employee versus an employer, the Principle invites and requires
consideration of society’s broader interest in law enforcement. The
Principle also explicitly recognizes the role that employees can play in
providing information that enhances the enforcement of society’s laws.
Thus, when courts examine an employee’s retaliation claim, they
should consider explicitly whether protecting the employee from
retaliation would encourage other employees to come forward with
information about illegal conduct, and whether that information actually
would help law enforcement efforts. This perspective might affect several
different areas of retaliation law that courts currently debate when
examining statutory anti-retaliation provisions as well as the common law
of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. I will address two such
areas in this section.
Causation. First, in recent years, courts increasingly have scrutinized
the level of causation required for a plaintiff to prove that an employer’s
retaliation was caused by an employee’s protected conduct. The typical
retaliation case requires the plaintiff to prove three primary elements: (1)
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action; and (3) that the protected
conduct caused the adverse action.407 As explained below, “but for”
causation could be required, or perhaps some lower standard is
applicable, such as requiring that protected conduct be a “motivating” or
“substantial” factor in the adverse employment action.
As a result of this ambiguity, courts have examined and disagreed
about the level of causation required in retaliation cases.408 Many older
anti-retaliation provisions express this causation standard by prohibiting
retaliation “because of” various protected conduct.409 Although one
reading of this language would suggest that “but for” causation is
required, a 1977 Supreme Court decision, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd.
Educ. v. Doyle,410 stated that the proper standard in a First Amendment
retaliation case was whether the protected conduct was a “motivating” or
“substantial” factor in the employer’s decision to take an adverse
See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 230; Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1133 (Title VII).
Other elements are sometimes included, such as employer knowledge of protected activity. See
WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 230.
408 Compare Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 334 (5th Cir. 2010) (using “motivating factor”
causation standard for Title VII retaliation claim) with Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1343
(11th Cir. 2000) (using “but for” standard for FLSA retaliation claim) and with Gupta v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that FLSA protected conduct must not be
“wholly unrelated”); cf. Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir.
2010) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s Gross opinion “clarified that unless a federal statute
provides otherwise, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating but-for causation in suits
brought under federal law”).
409 See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
623(d); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
215(a)(3); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
410 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
407
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employment action—a lower standard of proof for the employee than
“but for” causation.411 As the Court noted, “[a] borderline or marginal
candidate should not have the employment question resolved against him
because of constitutionally protected conduct.”412
Although Mt. Healthy was a constitutional case, the Supreme Court has
examined causation language in employment statutes as well. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,413 a majority of the Court held that Title VII mixedmotive discrimination cases required the plaintiff to prove only that an
employee’s protected status was a motivating factor in the employer’s
decision.414 In other words, the Court interpreted the “because of”
language in Title VII to mean “was a motivating factor in.” After the
plaintiff satisfied this “motivating factor” burden, the burden of
persuasion shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that the employer
would have taken the same adverse employment action even if it had not
considered the prohibited factor (such as race or gender)415 – a similar
affirmative defense to the one set forth in Mt. Healthy for First
Amendment retaliation cases.416 Satisfying this burden provided the
employer a complete affirmative defense to the employee’s discrimination
claim.417 In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress enshrined this mixedmotive analysis, and its accompanying “motivating factor” causation
standard, in Title VII’s statutory language regarding discrimination.418
Subsequently, Congress lowered even further the employee’s causation
burden in whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions passed in the last
decade by adopting a “contributing factor” standard,419 indicating a
substantial Congressional preference for this lower burden of proof.
See id. at 287.
Id. at 286. The Court also held that the employer should have an affirmative defense if the
employer would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected
conduct. See id. at 287.
413 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
414 A “mixed motive” discrimination case involves an allegation that an employer took an
adverse employment action against an employee because of both permissible and impermissible
considerations. See id. at 232, 244-247. Although Price Waterhouse did not result in a single majority
opinion, six justices agreed that the “motivating” or “substantial” factor standard was the proper
standard. See id. at 258 (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60 (opinion of White, J.); id. at 276 (opinion of
O’Connor, J.). See also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009)
(reiterating the holdings of the various opinions in Price Waterhouse).
415 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
416 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
417 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258.
418 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), Pub. L. 102-166, Title I, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075 (Nov. 21, 1991).
The Act also adopted the affirmative defense set forth in Price Waterhouse, but only permitted the
defense to relieve the employer of liability for certain damages claims. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
Congress utilized this same language in a provision prohibiting retaliation against employees who
take leave from employment to serve in the military. See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c).
419 A whistleblower must prove that his protected conduct was a “contributing factor” in the
adverse employment action taken against him. See, e.g., Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B); Pipeline Safety Improvement
411
412
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However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act did not resolve the debate around
the meaning of “because of” language because it applies only to Title VII’s
discrimination section (not the anti-retaliation provision). Older antiretaliation provisions still utilize the “because of” language, and lower
courts have struggled with the level of causation required by these older
anti-retaliation statutes, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, and the False Claims Act. Some courts, relying on Mt.
Healthy or Price Waterhouse, interpreted the statutes to adopt implicitly the
“motivating factor” standard (and also the complete affirmative defense
for employers set forth in Price Waterhouse).420
Complicating matters further, in a surprising 2009 decision in Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc.,421 the Supreme Court held that the “because of”
language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) required
a “but for” standard for its discrimination claims (the Court did not
address retaliation claims explicitly).422 Despite the fact that the ADEA
was patterned after Title VII and the two statutes have typically been
interpreted similarly, the Court’s rationale was that the 1991 Civil Rights
Act applied the “motivating factor” language only to Title VII’s
discrimination provision.423 Because Congress did not also amend the
ADEA with this language, the more traditional “but for” standard should
apply to the ADEA’s “because of” language.424 In other words, the Court
seemed to say that a statute’s use of the term “because of” should be
interpreted to mean “but for” causation.425
The Gross opinion seemed to close the door to any argument that
“because of” language could mean “motivating factor” rather than the
“but for” standard for retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and
other older statutes.426 Indeed, some Circuit Courts have interpreted Gross
to apply “but for” causation to any federal statute that does not explicitly
utilize some other standard.427 However, in March 2010, the Fifth Circuit
Act of 2002, 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(2)(B). Other statutes have explicitly adopted AIR-21’s burden of
proof standard. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C).
420 See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001) (assuming the
Price Waterhouse mixed-motive scheme applies to Title VII retaliation claims); Norbeck v. Basin
Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that the Price Waterhouse scheme
applies to the False Claims Act); Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999)
(Title VII retaliation claim).
421 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
422 See id. at 2350-51.
423 Id. at 2349.
424 See id.
425 See id. at 2350-51.
426 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d);
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3);
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4).
427 See, e.g., Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[Gross] holds that, unless a
statute (such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is
part of the plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation,
Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., Civil Action
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issued an unexpected opinion in Smith v. Xerox Corp.,428 finding that Title
VII’s retaliation provision permitted a mixed motive theory and its
accompanying “motivating factor” language from Price Waterhouse.429 The
employer argued to the Circuit Court that the Gross reasoning should
apply to Title VII retaliation cases because the 1991 Civil Rights Act did
not amend the retaliation provision of Title VII to include the “motivating
factor” language.430 Therefore, according to the employer, Congress must
have meant to keep the “but for” standard implied by the provisions
“because of” language.431 However, the court maintained that Gross
required courts to interpret Title VII and the ADEA differently, and that
Price Waterhouse should still apply to Title VII retaliation cases.432 Because
of Price Waterhouse’s application, the court concluded that a Title VII
retaliation plaintiff could satisfy its burden of proof by demonstrating that
the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in an adverse
employment action.433
To the extent Gross can be limited in this manner—to apply only to age
discrimination claims—lower courts should utilize the Anti-Retaliation
Principle to interpret retaliation statutes under the “motivating factor”
standard. Retaliation cases almost always involve difficult decisions
regarding mixed motives and retaliation, and a “but for” causation
standard would be devastating to employees who blow the whistle on
illegal conduct. Whistleblowers often are outspoken employees that can
be perceived as troublemakers—in large part that makes them
whistleblowers—and requiring that an employee prove that protected
conduct is the only factor in a disciplinary action will be enormously
difficult. Even under statutes that require only a “motivating factor”
standard (or the lower “contributing factor” standard), some empirical
No. 07-1994, ___ F. Supp.2d ____, 2010 WL 2470881, at *14 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2010) (applying “but
for” standard to ADA retaliation claim). In light of Gross, the lower courts appear to be reconsidering precedent that automatically applied Title VII’s burden-shifting schemes to other
employment statutes by closing examining various statute’s language to determine causation.
Compare Hunter v. Valley View Local Schools, 579 F.3d 688, 691-92 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
FMLA permitted a “mixed-motive” analysis based on the statute’s use of the term “interfered
with” and the Department of Labor’s interpretation of that term) with Rasic v. City of Northlake,
No. 08 C 104, 2009 WL 3150428, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sept.25, 2009) (finding that the FMLA’s use of “for
opposing” is not distinguishable from the ADEA’s use of “because of” and finding that “but for”
causation is appropriate).
428 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).
429 See id. at 330.
430 See id. at 328.
431 See id.
432 See id. at 330 (noting that the Supreme Court in Gross concluded that the ADEA and Title
VII were “materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion” (quoting Gross,
129 S. Ct. at 2348)).
433 See id. at 326-30. The Fifth Circuit also overruled its own precedent to find that a Title VII
plaintiff could satisfy the motivating factor burden with either direct or circumstantial evidence.
See id. at 331-32; compare with Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that direct evidence was required for a mixed motive retaliation case).
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evidence demonstrates that causation is notoriously difficult to prove.434 If
lower courts take the Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle seriously, then
they will look for ways to distinguish Gross and continue to apply the
“motivating factor” language from the Court’s Price Waterhouse decision in
retaliation cases.
Reasonable Belief. The Anti-Retaliation Principle also could influence
lower courts when they determine whether a whistleblower had a
“reasonable belief” that the conduct the employee reports is illegal. The
issue revolves around the “protected conduct” element of most retaliation
and wrongful discharge claims. This element requires the employee to
have engaged in specifically protected conduct, which often involves
reporting or opposing “any practice made . . . unlawful” by the statute
containing the anti-retaliation provision.435 Courts could interpret this
language to mean the employee must report actual illegal conduct to be
protected.436 In other words, if the employer’s actions were legal, the law
would not protect an employee from retaliation for reporting the conduct
under the mistaken, but reasonable, belief that the conduct was actually
illegal.437 Additionally, several common law courts require an employee to
report actual illegalities in order to state a claim for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy.438
Nevertheless, despite this potentially narrow protected conduct
requirement, other courts have required employees only to demonstrate a
“reasonable belief” that employer conduct is illegal.439 The most wellknown example of this standard stems from the Supreme Court’s 2001
decision in Clark County School District v. Breeden.440 In that case, the Court
assumed (without deciding) that the reasonable belief standard applied to
Title VII retaliation cases,441 a decision that paved the way for courts
uniformly to adopt the reasonable belief standard for a broad range of
434 See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 120-28 (2007).
435 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who
“opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”); ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 623(d) (same language); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (same); FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)
(same).
436 Some state courts have interpreted state statutory protection to require a report of actual
illegality. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 118, at 82 (citing Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 667
N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996) and Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196 (Minn. 2000)).
437 Compare Byers v. Dallas Morning News, 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000) (using subjective
and objective test) with EEOC v. C & D. Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975)
(finding that protected conduct involved only opposition to an actual unlawful employment
practice); cf. Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1140-41 (arguing that, in Clark County School District v.
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), “the Court’s language suggested that perhaps it would require an
actual violation, as the statute’s language requires).
438 See, e.g., Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463 (Okla. 2001).
439 See Brake, supra note 7, at 79 (citing cases).
440 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
441 See id. at 270.
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statutes.442 This requirement involves both a subjective and objective
component.443 The employee must subjectively believe the conduct is
illegal, and the employee’s belief must be objectively reasonable. The
employee could be wrong about the legality of the employer’s actions, but
as long as the employee’s belief was reasonable, the law would still
protect the employee from retaliation. Recently-passed federal laws
specifically require the employee to have a “reasonable belief” that the
employer action the employee reports or opposes is illegal.444
The reasonable belief standard seems to comport with the AntiRetaliation Principle, particularly when compared with the potential that
courts could interpret some statutory language to protect only reports of
actual violations.445 However, despite this seemingly employee-friendly
standard, lower courts often have applied the reasonable belief
requirement to narrow, rather than broaden, retaliation protection.446 In
many cases, lower courts have turned Breeden’s “reasonable belief”
standard into an implicit requirement that an employee report actual
violations of the law.447 These courts have required employees to know
442 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1129 n.7 (stating that all United States Circuit Courts
adopted the objectively reasonable standard after Breeden) (citing cases). Courts also use the
reasonable belief standards for other statutes, such as Title IX and Title VI, that do not specify the
standard to be utilized. See Brake, supra note 7, at 83 (citing cases).
443 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1134.
444 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
445 Some commentators have reviewed this landscape and suggested that an even more lenient
standard might better encourage employees to come forward with information of potential
wrongdoing. For example, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal argues that a “good faith” standard
would comport with an appropriately broad reading of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to
encourage employees to report violations of the statute. See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1131. In his
view, the law should protect employees who make reports about employer illegal conduct in good
faith, even if the employee is wrong and even if the employee’s belief about the conduct is
unreasonable. In the case of Title VII, at least, Professor Rosenthal acknowledges that courts likely
would reject a purely subjective good faith standard given the statutory language and courts’
interpretation of the language after Breeden, as well as EEOC interpretations that support a
“reasonable belief” requirement. See id. at 1130-31; see also Brake, supra note 7, at 81 n.215. More
broadly, the statutory language of more recently-enacted anti-retaliation provisions explicitly
utilize the “reasonable belief” standard, which would seem to preclude courts using the good faith
standard. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5, § 1553(b)(1)(B).
446 See Brake, supra note 7, at 76 (“One of the most problematic limits [of retaliation doctrine] is
the requirement that the challenger have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct amounts
to unlawful discrimination. Through this doctrine, courts have reinforced selective and narrow
interpretations of discrimination, while labeling broader conceptions as unreasonable.”); Brianne J.
Gorod, Rejecting Reasonableness, 56 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1469, 1472-73 (2007) (arguing that courts
should reject the reasonableness standard and instead hold that “a plaintiff's complaint would be
protected unless the defendant could establish that the plaintiff was acting in bad faith at the time
she made the complaint”).
447 See Moberly, supra note 133, at 1003 & n.161; Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1162-63 n. 231
(“[M]any courts . . . do not seem to be taking into account the “limited knowledge” most Title VII
plaintiffs have about the contours of Title VII, and the courts have consistently ruled against
employees after concluding that their belief of a Title VII violation was not objectively
reasonable.”); see id. at 1174-75 (citing Fogelman v. Greater Hazelton Health Alliance, 122 F. App'x
581, 584 (3rd Cir. 2004) and Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 153 F. App'x 637, 645-46 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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the subtle intricacies of the substantive law allegedly being violated by
their employer in order to conclude that an employee had a reasonable
belief that an illegality occurred.448 For example, in Jordan v. Alternative
Resources Corp.,449 the Fourth Circuit held that an employee who reported
a co-employee’s use of a racial slur was not protected from retaliation,
because no employee could have reasonably thought that a one-time use
of a racial epitaph violated Title VII.450 However, the Jordan court seemed
more intent on examining whether the incident could have amounted to
harassment rather than on whether the employee could have reasonably
believed that it violated the law.451
The Anti-Retaliation Principle could affect courts’ thinking about how
to interpret the reasonable belief standard to incorporate more fully the
Principle’s law enforcement goals. The Jordan court’s narrow construction
underestimates the chilling effect of retaliation and fails to consider that
employees typically do not have legal expertise. Broader construction of
the “protected activity” requirement might better support society’s
interest in law enforcement because employees will feel more free to
report conduct that might violate the law in situations in which a lay
person would not be sure about the conduct’s illegality. Society would be
better off with knowledgeable decision makers determining whether
disclosed conduct violates the law after an employee’s report, instead of
lay employees trying to determine legality before they report. This broader
protection should cause a court to be less interested in whether the
employee’s report precisely identified an explicit violation of law, and
more interested in the employer’s response to that report.
Moreover, other Supreme Court retaliation precedent supports a more
nuanced view of an employee’s background when considering whether
the employee objectively acted reasonably. In Burlington Northern, the
Court examined what type of employer action might be deemed
448 See, e.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
reasonableness of a report of illegality would be judged by whether reasonable juror would find
the conduct illegal); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 319-21 (4th Cir. 2003) (failing to protect
employee who complained about disparate impact under Title VI because the court found such
practices did not violate Title VI as a matter of law); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care
Center, Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707-08 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding employee was not protected from
retaliation because he complained about sexual harassment based on his sexual orientation, which
is not covered by Title VII); Little v. United Techs. Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959-61 (11th
Cir. 1997) (refusing to protect from retaliation an employee who reported a single racially offensive
comment); Holmes v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 96 V 6196 (NG), 2001 WL 797951, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
June 4, 2001) (dismissing retaliation claim based upon reporting sexual comments because the
comments were too isolated for the employee to reasonably believe that the comments created a
hostile environment); see also Brake, supra note 7, at 86-98 (discussing cases).
449 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2007).
450 See id. at 339-40. Title VII requires “severe and pervasive” harassment, a standard typically
not met by the single use of offensive language. See id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21 (1993)). See also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (holding that one
incident typically cannot create a hostile environment unless the incident is sufficiently severe).
451 See Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341-43.
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sufficiently adverse to be “retaliation.”452 As noted above, the Court
concluded that retaliation occurred if the employer action “could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”453 Later in the opinion, the Court stated that when courts
consider the “reasonable employee,” courts should take into account the
specific employee’s individual circumstances: “the significance of any
given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular
circumstances. Context matters.”454
In the same way, lower courts could fix the problems caused by
narrow interpretations of the “reasonable belief” standard by explicating
what the law expects from an employee when reporting misconduct.
Retaliation law should protect only “reasonable” reports, but that
standard should consider the education level and expertise of the
employee making the report, as well as the employee’s own employment
experiences with the employer.455 In-house counsel may be expected to
know the intricate details of sexual harassment law, but perhaps a bluecollar worker with a high school education should not.456 Accountants
may be expected to understand whether the securities regulations have
been violated, but should be given leeway when a law’s language can lead
to different reasonable interpretations.457
See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 57.
Id.
454 Id. at 69. As Professor Deborah Brake has pointed out, the Ninth Circuit in Breeden adopted
a similarly nuanced standard that the Supreme Court ignored in its Breeden opinion:
[T]he Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Breeden exhibited a more appropriate measure of
caution, emphasizing the need to take into account ‘the limited knowledge
possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their
claims.’” The Ninth Circuit evaluated reasonableness form the perspective of a
Title VII plaintiff. The Supreme Court’s cursory discussion of reasonableness
clouded the question of perspective and implicitly adopted the Court’s own
perspective, shaped by the limits of existing case law.
Brake, supra note 7, at 82-83 (citations omitted).
455 See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1178-79 (2nd Cir. 1996) (specifically
noting that the employee’s employment context and history, should be considered when
examining whether the employee reasonably believed she was a victim of harassment and
therefore engaged in protected conduct when she reported the alleged harassment) Cf. Brake, supra
note 7, at 103 (suggesting that courts adopt a standard that asks “whether the plaintiff can make a
reasoned case that the practices opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of discrimination
law” and arguing that the “perspective from which reasonableness is measured should not be that
of the judge reading and selecting the dominant legal precedents, but the reasonable employee,
student, or person in the organization who wishes to further the goals of discrimination law:
dismantling unjust privilege and promoting the conditions necessary for equal citizenship”).
456 Compare Nuskey v. Hochberg, 657 f. Supp.2d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2009) (“If plaintiff relied on an
EEO training to conclude that Title VII had been violated, her belief was in good faith and was not
unreasonable-even if her conclusion ultimately proved to be incorrect.”) with Henderson v. Waffle
House, Inc., 238 Fed. Appx. 499 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that waitress’s claim of sexual harassment
based on isolated jokes and comments were not sufficient for objectively reasonable basis for
retaliation)
457 Cf. Allen v. Stewart Enterp., No. 06-081, at 14 (ARB July 27, 2006) (finding that a “reasonable
belief” that a statute has been violated means a high certainty that the law has been broken). In
Allen, the employee alleged that she examined “internal consolidated financial statements” and
452
453
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Lower courts can best support the Anti-Retaliation Principle by
recognizing that employees typically are not lawyers and therefore should
not be required to evaluate numerous legal nuances before reporting
misconduct. Law enforcement experts and supervisors should be charged
with determining whether the law is being violated, not employees. The
law should simply encourage employees to come forward with
information that a reasonable person with their knowledge and
educational experience would believe to be a violation of the law. The
easiest way to encourage that process is to protect a broad range of
activity and then closely evaluate the employer’s response. In other
words, the Anti-Retaliation Principle best protects society’s interest when
the scrutiny in retaliation cases is directed towards the employer’s
response to whistleblowing, rather than the employee’s actions when
blowing the whistle. Lower courts would help achieve this result by
loosening the “reasonable belief” standard to permit the protection of
more reports of potentially illegal conduct.

Conclusion
In Supreme Court retaliation cases, despite the Court’s employerfriendly outlook and conservative judicial philosophy, it has protected
employees who act to enforce society’s laws. The lesson from the Court’s
use of the Anti-Retaliation Principle over the last fifty years and, in
particular, during the last five years, is that the Court rightly values
retaliation protection. Protecting employees from retaliation when they
disclose an employer’s illegal behavior advances society’s goal of strong
law enforcement. The Supreme Court and lower courts should work to
further the Anti-Retaliation Principle by strengthening the protections
available to whistleblowers who report illegal corporate behavior.
Although this Article has detailed the ways the Anti-Retaliation
Principle can provide lessons to courts in retaliation cases, Congress could
learn from the Principle as well. In a subsequent article, I will detail how
Congress can better utilize employees for law enforcement purposes. For
example, at a minimum, Congress could update older statutes to explicitly
provide employees strong anti-retaliation protection, which would relieve
the Supreme Court of having to perform substantial jurisprudential
that these statements indicated that the company violated an SEC rule. See id. The ARB, however,
found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule violation was not protected because these
internal reports did not have to be filed with the SEC, and therefore could not have violated the
rule. See id. Based on this nuance, the ARB found that the employee could not have “reasonably
believed” that a violation of the rule occurred. See id.; see also Jason M. Zuckerman, SOX’s
Whistleblower Provision: Promise Unfulfilled, 4 SECURITIES LIT. REPORTER 14, 16–17 (July/Aug. 2007); cf.
Gorod, supra note 446, at 1484–96 (criticizing the “reasonable belief” standard because courts may
use it to improperly reject retaliation claims under the opposition clause of Title VII).
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gymnastics in order to satisfy the Anti-Retaliation Principle.458
Furthermore, the Court’s Anti-Retaliation Principle teaches that Congress
may be a better hope for protecting government employees from
retaliation than relying upon First Amendment protections. Accordingly,
Congress could encourage reporting illegal conduct in the government by
improving the statutory whistleblower protections for federal employees.
In fact, identifying the Supreme Court’s use of the Anti-Retaliation
Principle helps focus attention on the fact that the Court itself often
answers questions that might be answered best by Congress: Which laws
should be enforced by relying, at least in part, upon employee
disclosures? Which employees should be protected from retaliation if they
disclose illegalities? To whom should employees be required to disclose
misconduct in order to be protected? What type of retaliation should be
prohibited? In its recent retaliation cases, the Supreme Court had to
answer these questions because Congress did not. Democratic norms
suggest that the legislature as well as the courts should broadly
implement the Anti-Retaliation Principle and balance employer and
employee interests with society’s interest in law enforcement. Until
Congress addresses these questions more consistently, however, it
appears that the Supreme Court is willing to step into the breach to
protect employees who report illegal conduct.

458 See discussion supra Part II.C. (discussing difficulties of finding implied retaliation
protection in Title IX, Section 1981, and the federal sector provision of the ADEA).

66

